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"We call hurricanes and earthquakes 'naturaldisasters,' but the
contours of these disasters are manmade."2
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, our country witnessed the complexities that natural disasters and their aftermaths pose when people
are forced to flee from uninhabitable areas. When Katrina made
landfall on August 29, 2005, it unleashed the most expensive and one
of the most deadly storms in United States history.' In Louisiana, the
New Orleans levees gave way, and floodwaters submerged the city.4
People were stranded on rooftops and waited for helicopters to airlift
them to safety.5 Others were subjected to unbearable conditions in
the Superdome and the Convention Center: they sat in blistering heat
amid failed sewage systems, with little or no food and water.6 Almost
1,500 people died in Louisiana alone and 135 are still missing. 7 In
3. SELECT BIPARTISAN COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA, A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, H.R. REP. No. 109-377,
at 7 (2006) [hereinafter A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE].
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, Hurricane Katrina: Reports
of Missing and Deceased, http://www.dhh.louisiana.gov/offices/page.asp?ID=192&
Detail-5248 (last visited Nov. 2, 2006) (statistics as of Aug. 6, 2006).
128
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Mississippi, another 238 people died as a result of the hurricane. 8
However, instead of breached levees, Mississippi experienced a massive storm surge that extended as far as ten miles inland. 9 Over half of
Mississippi suffered serious wind and water damage and was without
electricity.' ° Within a matter of days, Katrina resulted in the largest
displacement of Americans in over 150 years: Katrina displaced as
many as one million people.1
Even before the storm passed and the waters receded, people began
to ask questions about what could have been done differently to save
lives and to spare people from the storm-induced misery. After Katrina, the House of Representatives formed a committee to investigate
the preparation for and the response to Hurricane Katrina. 1 The introduction to the committee's report states, "It's been said that experience is the best teacher. The unfortunate thing is that the learning
process is sometimes such a painful one." 13 As a society, we will always have lessons to learn about preparedness and post-disaster response. However, Katrina's message was weightier than these lessons:
decades from now, when teachers and historians reflect back on the
Katrina disaster, the lesson that will emerge will be one about
humanity.
A grim side of humanity revealed itself in the aftermath of Katrina
when desperate storm victims attempted to flee the city of New Orleans. In the face of severe natural disasters, migration is inevitable and
unstoppable;1 4 and, most people would be appalled if migrants were
prohibited from leaving a hazardous and contaminated disaster area.
Yet, in the midst of the Katrina disaster, a city on the outskirts of New
Orleans did just that. Armed with machine guns,15 Gretna City police
officers collaborated with officers from the Jefferson Parish Sheriff's
Office and the Crescent City Connection Police Department1 6 to
block off the Gretna Bridge" 7-the only way out of New Orleans-for
8. National Weather Service, Hydrometeorological Prediction Center, http://
www.hpc.ncep.noaa.gov/tropical/rain/katrina2005.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2006) (statistics as of June, 2006).

9. A

FAILURE OF INITIATIVE,

supra note 3, at 7.

10. Id.

11. Peter Grier, The Great Katrina Migration, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 12,
2005, http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0912/pOlsOl-ussc.htm.
12. A

FAILURE OF INITIATIVE,

supra note 3.

13. Id. at 9.
14. Suzette Brooks Masters, Environmentally Induced Migration:Beyond a Cul-

ture of Reaction, 14

GEO. IMMIGR.

L.J. 855, 856 (2000).

15. Pascal Riche, Gretna's Choice, http://www.tpmcafe.com/story/2005/9/10/94823/
6592 (last visited Sept. 11, 2006).
16. Gardiner Harris, Police in Suburbs Blocked Evacuees, Witnesses Report, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 10, 2005, at A13 ("Arthur Lawson, chief of the Gretna, La., Police Department, confirmed that his officers, along with those from the Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office and the Crescent City Connection Police, sealed the bridge").
17. The bridge is actually named the "Crescent City Connection"; however, most
of the news reports have referred to the bridge as the "Gretna Bridge." Because 129
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at least two days,' 8 thereby preventing hungry, injured, and desperate
people from escaping the toxic city.' 9 Evacuees scurried as officers
fired their weapons into the air 10 and yelled, "We're not going to have
any Superdomes over here ....This is not New Orleans ....Get the
f*** off the bridge."2 1
Many of the evacuees who had made their way to the bridge were
elderly and disabled and suffered from critical health conditions.2"
Others carried children who had not eaten for days.2 3 As a result of
the police blockade, many people died before they could be rescued.2 4
On December 22, 2005, Tracey and Dorothy Dickerson filed a lawsuit against the City of Gretna and the individual police officers that
blocked the Gretna Bridge.25 Among the claims that the Dickersons
assert in their lawsuit are violations of their constitutional right to
many people are now familiar with the name "Gretna Bridge," that is how the Author
will refer to it in this Comment.
18. Phillip Clark, Bridge to Nowhere 5 (Apr. 28, 2006) (unpublished comment, on
file with author), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/library/disasters/Clark.pdf).
19. Posting of sfsocialists to http://www.livejournal.com/users/sfsocialists/3687.html
(Sept. 5, 2006, 17:39:36).
20. Id.
21. The Bridge to Gretna, Dec. 18, 2005, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/12/
15/60minutes/mainl129440.shtml.
22. Posting of sfsocialists, supra note 19; see also Rogers Cadenhead, Two Americas, One Bridge, WORKBENCH, Sept. 17, 2005, http://www.cadenhead.org/workbench/
news/2762/two-americas-one-bridge.
23. See Posting of sfsocialists, supra note 19.
24. See First Supplemental and Amending Class Action Complaint at 2-3, 5, Dickerson v. City of Gretna, No. 05-0667 (E.D. La. filed Apr. 11, 2006).
25. Complaint at 1-2, Dickerson v. City of Gretna, No. 05-6667 (E.D. La. Dec. 22,
2005). The original complaint-filed as a class action-named as defendants the City
of Gretna, the City of Gretna Police Department, and the individual police officers
whose names were to be added to the complaint once the plaintiffs were able to identify them. Id. at 2. However, the First Supplemental and Amending Class Action
Complaint, supra note 24, only named the City of Gretna and the City of Gretna
Police Department as defendants. On May 19, 2006, the district court granted in part
the defendants' Motion to Dismiss and dismissed the claim against the City of Gretna
Police Department. Court's Order and Reasons on Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 1, Dickerson v. City of Gretna, No. 05-6667 (E.D. La. May 19, 2006). Presumably, the court
dismissed the claim against the police department because it "is not a separate juridical entity and has no legal capacity to sue or be sued." Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 1,
Dickerson v. City of Gretna, No. 05-6667 (E.D. La. Mar. 20, 2006). In light of plaintiffs' Second Supplemental and Amending Complaint, filed on August 30, 2006, the
Dickersons' case is no longer a class action lawsuit. Second Supplemental and
Amending Complaint at 1, Dickerson v. City of Gretna, No. 05-6667 (E.D. La. filed
Aug. 30, 2006). Furthermore, while the Dickersons "realleged all allegations in their
initial Complaint and First Supplemental and Amending Complaint," several individuals and entities were added as defendants. Id. at 2-3. The named defendants include: "City of Gretna Police Department through the City of Gretna[;] ...Arthur
Lawson, Chief of Police for the City of Gretna [in his individual capacity][;] . .. officers of the City of Gretna Police Department [in their individual capacities], whose
identities are not known at present[;] ...Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office[;] ...Harry
Lee, Jefferson Parish Sheriff [in his individual capacity][;] . . .[and] deputies of the
Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office [in their individual capacities], whose identities are
130
not known at present." Id.
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travel; their right to peaceful assembly; their right to due process; their
right to equal protection; their right to be protected against unreasonable search and seizure; and their right to be protected against cruel
and unusual punishment. 26 Damages listed in the complaint included,
"Physical pain past and future; Mental Anguish; Medical Expenses;
Future Medical Expenses;
Loss of Life; Loss of Consortium; and Loss
27
of Earning Capacity.
The police officers who blocked the Gretna Bridge may have in fact
violated several rights guaranteed by the Constitution. However, this
Comment focuses on only one-the right to the freedom of travel.
This Comment argues that the City of Gretna should be held civilly
liable for its actions; and, that the individual police officers who
blocked the bridge should be held both civilly and criminally liable for
their actions. By blocking the bridge, the officers intentionally deprived New Orleans residents of their right to the freedom of travel.
Part II contextualizes this argument by providing a history of the
poverty and racism long faced by many New Orleans residents. To a
large extent, poverty and health shaped New Orleanians' evacuation
and survival strategies; and, examining the reasons behind the strategies employed by different sectors of the population is fundamental to
understanding why so many New Orleans residents did not or could
not evacuate. Racism further complicated these strategies. The history of police brutality in and around New Orleans indicates that routine abuse may have been an aggravating factor in Katrina's
aftermath. In addition, both the media and government officials perpetuated negative stereotypes about New Orleans residents, which
prolonged evacuation and rescue efforts and greatly exacerbated
evacuees' suffering. The Gretna Bridge incident is just one illustration of how, in the wake of Katrina, poverty and racism collided to
produce unjust consequences for residents who were simply struggling
to survive.
Part III reviews the fundamental right to travel under the Due Process Clause and discusses this right in the context of emergency situations. Part IV considers the possible civil and criminal consequences
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 18 U.S.C. § 242 for depriving individuals
of their right to travel.
Finally, Part V applies the fundamental right to travel and the remedies afforded under § 1983 and § 242 to the Gretna Bridge incident.
This section argues that the City of Gretna should be held civilly liable
for the officers' actions and that the individual police officers who
blocked the Gretna Bridge should be held both civilly and criminally
liable for their actions.
26. Second Supplemental and Amending Complaint, supra note 25, at 5-6.
27. Id. at 7-8.
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BACKGROUND

Underlying the Katrina disaster and the Gretna Bridge incident is a
history of poverty in the areas of New Orleans hit hardest by the
storm. The low-income residents of these areas were the least able to
leave the city before the storm, and thus were most likely to be
stranded on the wrong side of the Gretna Bridge-the only way out of
New Orleans after Katrina. Also permeating the Gretna Bridge incident is a history of police brutality rife with racism-a history that has
earned local police departments a foul reputation and has bred a
fierce animosity among local residents. When the actions of the police
officers who blocked the Gretna Bridge are viewed in the context of
routine abuse, and further seen as being directed at the poorest residents of New Orleans, the mindset of those officers becomes clear:
the police who blocked the Gretna Bridge acted willfully and with
total disregard for the residents whose lives depended on crossing it.
A.

Survival Strategies in the Wake of Katrina: An Illustration of the
Role that Social Stratification Plays in "Choosing" How to
Cope With a Hurricane

The nation watched in horror as picture after picture flashed across
television sets and unmasked the devastation wreaked by Hurricane
Katrina. Some reporters blamed the government for its slow response.2 8 Others blamed the tens of thousands of hurricane victims
who did not evacuate. 2 9 But, without understanding social stratification and its effects on residents' abilities to evacuate, blaming the victims of Katrina is unfair.3 °
Before Katrina, New Orleans had "one of the highest levels of income inequality in our country. ' 3' Almost twenty-eight percent of
New Orleans's residents lived below the poverty line; almost 12%
were over the age of sixty-five, and over 27% did not have a car.32
These demographics did not bode well for the victims of Katrina as
several recent natural disasters have demonstrated that, "who lives
and who dies is intricately related to issues of poverty and access ....
[T]he [safety of the areas in which] homes are built,.., the soundness
of the structures, [and] the length of time it takes for relief to arrive,
28. Elizabeth Fussell, Leaving New Orleans: Social Stratification, Networks, and
Hurricane Evacuation, Soc. Sci. RES. COUNCIL, Sept. 26, 2005, http://understand-

ingkatrina.ssrc.org/Fussell/.
29. Id. In fact, in a television interview, Senator Rick Santorum suggested punishing people who do not evacuate during hurricanes: "There may be a need to look at
tougher penalties on those who decide to ride [out hurricanes] and understand that
there are consequences to not leaving." Santorum, BarbaraBush Criticizedfor Evacuee Comments, Sept. 7, 2005, http://www.nbclO.com/news/4943604/detail.html.

30. See Fussell, supra note 28.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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[are] all . . .intricately tied to poverty .... , Clearly, the Katrina
disaster was no exception. Residents who remained in New Orleans
to ride out the storm had few alternatives.
In an article discussing the relationship between social stratification
and hurricane evacuation strategies, Elizabeth Fussell explains that
social stratification shaped residents' abilities to deal and their strategies for dealing with the arrival of Hurricane Katrina. 3' Evacuation
strategies were largely impacted by "income-level, age, access to information, access to private transportation, . . .physical mobility and
health, . . .occupations[,] and . . . social networks outside of the
35
city."
For example, in most hurricanes upper- and middle-class residents
evacuate twenty-four to forty-eight hours before a hurricane is predicted to hit.36 Prior to Katrina, most upper- and middle-income New
Orleans residents had evacuation strategies that were straightforward:
"make a hotel reservation or arrange a visit with out-of-town friends
and family, board the house windows[,] . .. pack the car, get some
cash and leave town."3 7 For these residents, the cost of missing a few
days of work was less likely to be a determinative factor in deciding
whether or not to evacuate.3 8
On the other hand, in most hurricanes low-income residents tend to
have fewer choices in deciding how to prepare for a hurricane, and
they are often the least able to evacuate. 3 9 Because Hurricane Katrina hit at the end of the month, many New Orleans residents who
lived from paycheck-to-paycheck did not have the economic resources
necessary to evacuate. n Not surprisingly, these residents were also
less likely to own a vehicle.4 1 Moreover, the people who were least
able to leave the city also lived in the most poverty-stricken neighborhoods, hardest hit by the flooding.4 2
In addition to low-income residents, elderly, sick, and disabled people are typically less able to evacuate during hurricanes than people
33. Flaherty, supra note 2.
34. Fussell, supra note 28. Generally speaking, social stratification is the hierarchy
of social classes and social statuses within a society. See Kathryn M. Stanchi, Who
Next, the Janitors?A Socio-Feminist Critique of the Status Hierarchy of Law Professors, 73 UMKC L. REv. 467, 470-73 (2004). While "the source of institutionalized
inequality can vary," social stratifications are often thought to result not from personal differences, but from "contrived or artificial criteria" or "characteristic[s] that
[have] subjectively been assigned social importance." Id. at 470-71.
35. Fussell, supra note 28.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. Id.

41. Id.
42. Id.
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who are in good health.4 3 Many elderly and disabled people simply
choose not to evacuate during a hurricane because of the difficulties in
managing their health conditions outside of their homes.44 Katrina
was no exception. In the aftermath of Katrina, many residents died of
complications related to asthma, diabetes, and high blood pressureconditions that are normally easy to manage unless medicine or treatment is inaccessible.45
Hurricane Katrina was a reminder of an unfortunate reality: inequalities in income often result in dire, life-and-death consequences
for those who lack the means to prepare for and survive natural disasters. When developing city-wide disaster plans, residents will greatly
benefit if city leaders take into account the role that social stratification plays in shaping residents' evacuation strategies. Considering the
reasons behind the choices that people make in the midst of a disaster
may help lessen the discriminatory impact that future disasters have
on select populations.
B.

Racial Discriminationand Police Brutality in New Orleans

The Gretna Bridge incident was foreshadowed not only by poverty,
but also by the attitudes of disreputable local officials. News reports
that describe incidents of police brutality rarely surprise the people
who live in and around New Orleans.4 6 Unfortunately, in a city that is
almost 70% African-American, 47 police brutality is commonplace. 48
There are too many incidents to discuss each one in this Comment,
but one thing is certain: discriminatory police policies and practices
begin at the top with law enforcement officials who have the highest
authority.
For example, Sheriff Harry Lee of Jefferson Parish is infamous for
being the nucleus of racist philosophies as well as the initiator of blatantly prejudicial policies.49 In fact, Jefferson Parish, one of the four
parishes that make up the Greater New Orleans region,50 has been
described as "Louisiana's most notoriously racist parish."5 1 Sheriff
Lee made headlines when, in the 1980s, he ordered his officers to stop
43. Id.
44. See id.
45. Id.
46. See Flaherty, supra note 2.
47. A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 3, at 444 (supplementary report of Rep.
Cynthia A. McKinney).
48. See Flaherty, supra note 2.
49. Id.
50. The New Orleans Metropolitan Area is composed of seven parishes; of those,
four comprise the Greater New Orleans region: Jefferson, Orleans, Plaquemines, and
St. Bernard. See New Orleans: Tourism, http://ccet.louisiana.edu/03a CulturalTourismFiles/02.5 Greater NewOrleans.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2006).
51. Rogers Cadenhead, Grand Jury Will Investigate Gretna Bridge Blockade,
WORKBENCH, Aug. 4, 2006, http://www.cadenhead.org/workbench/news/2987/grandjury-investigate-gretna-bridgeG.
Roger Cadenhead states that, "Jefferson ParislI34
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African-Americans if they were seen crossing the Gretna Bridge into
the predominately-white City of Gretna: "[If] two young blacks [are
seen] driving a rinky-dink car in a predominately white neighborhood . . . [t]hey'll be stopped. '52 In April 2005, when Sheriff Lee's
officers were found using a "'blatantly racist caricature' of a black
male" for target practice, Sheriff Lee laughed at the allegations stating, "I've looked at it, I don't find it offensive, and I have no interest
in correcting it."'5 3 About a month later, Jefferson Parish police fired
110 shots into a truck that had been reported as stolen, killing a sixteen-year-old African-American boy and injuring two of his passengers.54 When black ministers criticized the incident, Sheriff Lee
responded, "They can kiss my ass."55
Jefferson Parish is known not only for being "notoriously racist,"
but also for having an unusual number of police brutality incidents. A
federal study conducted in 1991 concluded that Jefferson Parish police
are "seven times more likely to use deadly force than the national
average. "56 While its population is only about 500,000, Jefferson Parish ranks third in the nation-behind only the cities of New Orleans
57
and Los Angeles-for the number of police brutality complaints.
The City of Gretna has also had its fair share of brutality complaints.
In fact, the Metropolitan Crime Commission has accused Gretna's police department of "systematic brutality. '58 In 2000, five officers were
fired for beating a suspect. 5 9 The following year, in a separate incident, a resident sued the police department in federal court for police
brutality.60
Not surprisingly, Sheriff Lee and Gretna's Chief of Police6" were at
the center of the Gretna Bridge incident. However, to discuss only
the local law enforcement's role in the discrimination long faced by
was described . . . as 'Louisiana's most notoriously racist parish' by the Louisiana
Capital Assistance Center .... " Id.
52. Flaherty, supra note 2; A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 3, at 458 (supplementary report of Rep. Cynthia A. McKinney).
53. Flaherty, supranote 2; A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 3, at 458 (supplementary report of Rep. Cynthia A. McKinney).
54. Flaherty, supra note 2; A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 3, at 458 (supplementary report of Rep. Cynthia A. McKinney).
55. Flaherty, supra note 2; A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 3, at 458 (supplementary report of Rep. Cynthia A. McKinney).
56. Elisa Waingort, Two Black Men Die in Louisiana Sheriffs Custody, Apr. 3,
1994, http://www.hoboes.com/pub/Prohibition/Crime%20and%20Punishment/Corruption/United %20States/Drugs%20Cause%20Bruises%3f.
57. Id.
58. Dennis Persica, After 26 Years, Gretna Police Chief B.H. Miller Jr. Says He
Knows 'When To Hold and... When To Fold,' TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 29, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 10241747.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. The incidents of police brutality mentioned above occurred while Chief B.H.
Miller Jr. was Gretna's Chief of Police. Id. In April of 2005, Arthur Lawson became
the new Chief of Police. Id.
11
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residents of the Greater New Orleans region would minimize an unfortunate reality. As the next section demonstrates, racial prejudice is
not just a New Orleans problem: racial prejudice still plagues this
country as a whole.
C.

Racial DiscriminationFollowing Katrina

"Something is wrong in America!" Roslyn Brock said to the audience at an NAACP state convention while discussing Katrina in the
context of her speech about civil rights.62 Following Katrina, many
people likely shared Brock's concern. And, unfortunately, the minute-by-minute news reports provided a constant reminder that our
country was floundering and the world was watching. Most unflattering were the remarks that came from the mouths of our country's
leaders, whose tones ranged from plainly insensitive to unequivocally
bigoted.
After touring the Houston Astrodome that temporarily housed
thousands of hurricane victims, Barbara Bush was quoted as saying,
"So many of the people here, you know, were underprivileged anyway, so this is working very well for them."63 Former House Majority
Leader Tom DeLay, in apparent agreement with Barbara Bush, reportedly compared children's experiences of living at the Astrodome
with being at camp and asked a group of boys, "Now, tell me the
truth, boys, is this kind of fun?"' Some politicians were more blatant
with their remarks. Representative Richard H. Baker told lobbyists,
"We finally cleaned up public housing in New Orleans. We couldn't
do it, but God did." 65 With crime in mind, Senator Rick Santorum
suggested that people who "ignored" the evacuation orders should be
punished.6 6 A suggestion by former Secretary of Education Bill Bennett went even further: "If you wanted to reduce crime ... you could
abort every black baby in this country and your crime rate would go
down."6 7 Bennett later admitted "that race was on his mind because
of recent stories ... about New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina."68
Further degrading to the African-American residents of the
Greater New Orleans region were the negative racial stereotypes that
62. Michael Paul Williams, NAACP Official: 'Freedom Needs Voice,' RICHMOND
TIMES DISPATCH, Oct. 30, 2005, http://www.timesdispatch.com/servlet/Satellite?page
name=RTD/MGArticle/RTDBasicArticle&c=MGArticle&cid=1128767840408&
path=!news!localupdates&s=1045855935074.
63. Santorum, BarbaraBush Criticizedfor Evacuee Comments, supra note 29.
64. Charles Babington, Some GOP Legislators Hit Jarring Notes in Addressing
Katrina, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/09/AR2005090901930.html.
65. Id.
66. See Santorum, BarbaraBush Criticizedfor Evacuee Comments, supra note 29.
67. Media Matters, Bennett Cited Katrina Aftermath, Swift's "A Modest Proposal"
As Inspiring His Comments, Sept. 30, 2005, http://mediamatters.org/items/200509
300004.
68. Id.
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news reporters relentlessly reinforced. These stereotypes were perpetuated by false media reports of utter pandemonium. The report by
the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for
and Response to Hurricane Katrina stated, "[f]alse media reports impeded the relief effort and affected decisions on where to direct resources."6 9 When asked whether these false reports had hindered
rescue efforts, the Director of Homeland Security for the City of New
Orleans stated, "absolutely. ' 7° Furthermore, "[o]nce the seed of fear
was planted it spread like an out of control virus,"' 7 ' resulting in President George Bush's declaration of "zero tolerance" for looting and
Governor Kathleen Blanco's shoot-to-kill orders. 72 Not only were the
media reports of rampant violence never substantiated, none "[o]f the
six deaths in the Superdome ... were crime-related. ' 73 Similarly, National Guard officials reported that "they encountered no lawlessness
or any resistance when they moved in to clear out the Convention
Center. ' 74 In fact, in the crowd of 19,000 people, only thirteen weapons were found.7 5 Reports of gunfire in the streets of New Orleans
were also later found to be exaggerated or false. 76 For example, on
September 1, CNN repeatedly reported that evacuations of the
Superdome had been suspended because someone fired a gun at a
helicopter;7 7 however, this story was never verified and "in the end,
there were no bullet holes found in any helicopters. ' 78 State and local
officials stated later that the "rampant shooting" reported by the media actually came from people trapped in their homes who were attempting to attract rescuers.7 9
In addition to the false reports, news reporters tended to attribute
the suffering of African-American residents to poverty. For example,
Wolf Blitzer of CNN stated, "You simply get the chills every time you
see these poor individuals ... so many of these people, almost all of
them we see, are so poor and they are so black."80 While AfricanAmericans largely populated the poverty-stricken neighborhoods
hardest hit by Katrina, many people would be surprised to learn that
in "the Greater New Orleans Area[,] in the wake of Katrina, a greater
number of whites (85,000) live[d] below the poverty line than [did]
69. A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 3, at 248.
70. Id.
71. Michael I. Niman, Katrina's America: Failure, Racism, and Profiteering, THE
HUMANIST, Nov.-Dec. 2005, at 11, availableat http://www.thehumanist.org/humanist/
articles/Niman.Katrina.pdf.
72. Id. at 11-12.
73. A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 3, at 248.
74. Id. at 248-49.
75. Id. at 249.
76. Id. at 247.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 446 (supplementary report of Rep. Cynthia A. McKinney).
E
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'
minorities (65,000)." 81
In fact, many Katrina victims suffered not because of poverty, but because of sickness, disability, and age. 82 "Fourteen percent of residents in the Lower Ninth [Ward] 83were senior
citizens. Another fourteen percent were handicapped.
While the media echoed racist stories of violence that instilled fear
and apprehension in the minds of relief workers, sick and elderly people sat under bridges and overpasses in trash, feces, and urine, with
guns aimed at them by police officers. 84 "When they died in their

wheelchairs,... the authorities... push[ed] them aside."85 One para-

plegic was removed from his home and taken to the Superdome where
he sat "without food, water[,] or medical care for five days."86 Another woman recalled her struggle to get medical help for her mother
who was seriously ill and in danger of having a stroke.87 The first time
she approached military personnel and explained that her mother was
dehydrated and close to death, a worker gave her water.88 But, the
next time she approached Homeland Security personnel and explained the urgency of her mother's condition, one of the workers
stated, "Well, let 'em die, that's one less nigger we gotta' worry
about."89 While people might be skeptical of these accounts, stories
like these were repeated over and over to the Select Committee responsible for investigating the response to Katrina.90
Finally, racism existed in the strange, yet widely accepted, use of the
term "refugee" to describe evacuees. 91 Because the term "refugee"
typically describes "a person [who is] crossing a national border in
search of security," the Katrina evacuees were ostensibly painted as
"others"-not on equal footing with the residents of the nearby cities
and states that they fled to. However, as one evacuee stated, "We
ain't refugees. [We're] citizen[s]." 92 Once it became evident that the
use of the term "refugee" was not sitting well with Katrina evacuees,
George Bush asked that the media stop using the term; and, many
reporters did.93

For many, Katrina came in two parts. First, the natural disaster
swept away homes and flooded cities. But the second storm-the
manmade disaster created by a string of human errors and further
compounded by factors such as poverty and racism-increased and
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 444.
See id. at 496.
Id.
Id. at 454-55.
Id. at 455.
Id.
Id. at 455-56.
Id. at 456.
Id.

90. See generally A

FAILURE OF INITIATIVE,

supra note 3.

91. Id. at 446 (supplementary report of Rep. Cynthia A. McKinney).

92. Id. at 446-47.
93. Id. at 447.
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prolonged suffering and resulted in hundreds, if not thousands, of unnecessary deaths. Katrina was the first time in decades in which the
face of discrimination was so mercilessly unmasked. The nation
watched in bewilderment as the floodwaters engulfed not only the cities along the Gulf Coast, but also a century of progress in the civil
rights movement.
Few, however, were prepared for what happened on the Gretna
Bridge.
D.

The Gretna Bridge Incident

It has been compared to Bloody Sunday. 94 Others have called it
'
"the worst American civil rights episode ... in the 21st Century."95
As the "hurricane-ravaged [city of] New Orleans filled with sewagetainted floodwaters and corpses," the mayor of New Orleans, Ray
Nagin, urged residents to escape the city by crossing "a bridge ...
[that lead] to ... the city's suburban west bank." 96 The Crescent City
Connection, also known as the Gretna Bridge, carries U.S. Route 90
and Interstate 910 over the Mississippi River into New Orleans. 97 After the hurricane, this bridge was the only remaining route out of New
Orleans; all other bridges and highways out of New Orleans were
flooded in both directions.98 Yet, about three days after the storm,
"dehydrated, starved, [and] tired people," many of whom had walked
miles to reach the outskirts of New Orleans, were met with machine
guns and attack dogs and were told to turn around. 99 The City of
Gretna, whose website boasts that it enhances its citizens' lives
through "new and innovative approaches" to crime,1 00 collaborated
with the Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office and the Crescent City Connection Police to block the Gretna Bridge in an effort to prevent evacuees from escaping the flooded city. 10 ' As one witness recounted, a
94. Glen Ford & Peter Gamble, Whose Plan for New Orleans?: Blacks Need a
COMMENTATOR 2, Nov. 10, 2005, http://www.blackcommentator.com/158/158-cover-no-vision.pdf. Representative Cynthia McKinney said,
"The Gretna City Bridge incident will live on in civil rights history just as does Bloody
Sunday at the Edmund Pettus Bridge," as she marched across the Gretna Bridge with
approximately 100 other protestors. Id.; see also Emerging Minds, Cynthia McKinney
Makes Statement on Racist Blocking of Bridge During Hurricane Katrina, Nov. 2,
2005, http://www.emergingminds.org/magazine/content/item/2713/catid/15.
95. Emerging Minds, supra note 94.
96. Id.
97. See Louisiana at SouthEastRoads.com, U.S. Highway 90 Business, http://
www.southeastroads.com/us-090_busla.html (last visited on Sept. 11, 2006).
98. Wikipedia, Crescent City Connection, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CrescentCityConnection (last visited Sept. 11, 2006).
99. The Bridge to Gretna, supra note 21; see also Riche, supra note 15.
100. Gretna Police Department, Mission Statement, http://www.gretnapolice.com
(last visited Sept. 11, 2006).
101. Harris, supra note 16. "Arthur Lawson, chief of the Gretna, La., Police Department, confirmed that his officers, along with those from the Jefferson Parish Sher139
iff's Office and the Crescent City Connection Police, sealed the bridge." Id.
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group consisting of people using wheelchairs and crutches, parents
with strollers, and elderly people who were very sick,1" 2 approached
the bridge and were confronted by a wall of armed officers.10 3 Before
the evacuees were close enough to speak, the officers began firing
their weapons over the evacuees' heads."° All the while officers were
heard screaming, "We don't want another Superdome .... This isn't
New Orleans."1 °5
As a result of the officers' actions, people were trapped in
deplorable
conditions for days." 6 Several of the stranded victims
10 7
died.
In a journal that Larry Bradshaw and Lorrie Beth Slonsky later
posted online, they described their experience following Katrina and
their attempts to leave New Orleans, culminating in their attempt to
cross the Gretna Bridge.1" 8 Bradshaw and Slonsky live in San Francisco but were in New Orleans for a paramedics' conference. 10 9 Unlike the majority of the people that the police prevented from crossing
the Gretna Bridge, Bradshaw and Slonsky are white. 110 However, the
couple's account confirms that in the aftermath of Katrina, "the official relief effort was callous, inept, and racist."11
The couple's journal begins forty-eight hours after Hurricane Katrina hit shore." 2 By that time, any food that had been available was
already spoiled, mostly due to the ninety-degree heat. Not surprisingly, residents and tourists were growing thirsty and hungry.1 13 In
the journal, the couple describes how they and a group of people
1 14
pooled together $25,000 to have ten buses take them out of the city.
The group, including Bradshaw and Slonsky, waited for several days;
but, the buses never came. They later learned that the buses had been
"commandeered by the military.1 115 Within six days of the storm, the
102. See CNN.com, Transcripts, http://transcripts.cnn.com/transcripts/0509/12/
asb.02.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2006).
103. Posting of sfsocialists, supra note 19.
104. Harris, supra note 16. "Arthur Lawson, chief of the Gretna, La., Police Department, confirmed that his officers, along with those from the Jefferson Parish Sheriffs Office and the Crescent City Connection Police, sealed the bridge." Id.
105. Id.
106. See Posting of sfsocialists, supra note 19.
107. See First Supplemental and Amending Class Action Complaint, supra note 24,
at 5.
108. Posting of sfsocialists, supra note 19.
109. Harris, supra note 16; Chip Johnson, Police Made Their Storm Misery Worse,
SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Sept. 9, 2005, http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/C/a/
2005/09/09/BAGLiEL1KH1.DTL&type=printable.
110. Johnson, supra note 109.
111. Posting of sfsocialists, supra note 19.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
1A(
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of
sanitation was "dangerously abysmal."' 1 6 The hotels had run out 117
fuel and water and were forced to close down and lock their doors.
Officials told the hotels that their guests needed to report to the Convention Center to wait on buses.' 18 With the group, the couple entered the center of the city and walked towards the Convention
Center where they experienced their first hostile encounter with law
enforcement." 9 National Guard officials told the group that it would
not be allowed in the Superdome because the Superdome had "descended into a humanitarian and health hellhole., 1 20 Furthermore,
the officials informed the group that it could not enter the Convention
Center-the city's only other shelter-because the Convention
Center "was also descending into chaos and squalor."'12 1 The couple
asked the officials what the alternative was, but the officials replied
that it was not their problem. 22 Discouraged, the group asked the
officials if they at least had any water, but the officials did not have
any to spare. 2 3
With few alternatives, the group decided to camp outside of the police command center where they would be in plain view of the media.' 2 4 However, their strategy of drawing the media's attention failed
125
when a police commander told the group that they could not stay.
The police commander said that police officers had buses lined up at
the Gretna Bridge to take people out of the city. 1 26 Because the
group had continually received wrong information during the preceding days, the couple explained to the commander that they were skepthat buses were waiting: "I
tical.' 27 But, the commander assured them
28
swear to you that the buses are there.'
The group marched towards the bridge with enthusiasm and told
people it passed that buses were waiting at the bridge. 1 29 The evacuees walked for two to three miles in the rain until they approached the
3
bridge.' 3 ° But, when the group finally arrived, there were no buses.' '
The commander had lied. 132 Instead of buses, armed sheriffs lined the
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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bridge. 133 Before the group could ask questions, the sheriffs 34fired
their weapons into the air causing the crowd to scatter in fear.'
A few people from the group were able to get close enough to the
officers to explain what they had been told. 135 But, the sheriffs said
that there were no buses; the police commander had lied to the group
to get them to move.1 36 When the group asked why they could not
cross the bridge, the police officers "responded that the West Bank
was not going to become137New Orleans . . . there would be no
Superdomes in their City.
The group eventually built an encampment on a median where they
knew they would be visible and secure. 1 38 From the encampment, the
group watched as others also approached the police officers: "All day
long, we saw other families, individuals and groups make the same trip
up the incline in an attempt to cross the bridge, only to be turned
away. Some [were] chased away with gunfire ....139 Other witnesses
corroborated Bradshaw and Slonsky's account: officers "verbally berated and humiliated" evacuees, 4 ° "press[ed] . . . firearms against
[their] bodies, [placed them into] headlocks and/or chokeholds, and
violently thr[ew them] to the ground."' 4 1 "Thousands of New
Orlean[ians] were . . .prohibited from self-evacuating the [c]ity on
foot."' 4 2 However, those with vehicles were permitted to cross the
highway. 4 3 The group watched as people stole "trucks, buses, moving
vans, semi-trucks"-"any car that could be hotwired."'1 44 Each vehicle contained
people who were desperately trying to escape the miser1 45
able city.
The couple's group soon grew to almost 100 people. 4 6 As more
and more people congregated around the bridge, the media began to
pay attention. 1 47 In two separate Fox News reports, Geraldo Rivera
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Shaun Waterman, Cops Trapped Survivors in New Orleans, Sept. 9, 2005, http:/
/www.libertypost.org/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=108700.
141. First Supplemental and Amending Class Action Complaint, supra note 24, at
3.
142. Posting of sfsocialists, supra note 19.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Hannity and Colmes (FOX News Channel television broadcast Sept. 2, 2005),
available at http://homepage.mac.com/mkoldys/iblog/C168863457/E20050902214254/
index.html.
142
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and Shepard Smith described what they saw at the Gretna Bridge.1 4 8
In tears, Geraldo made an emotional plea:
There are so many babies here ....It's not a question [of] sensitivity. It's a question of reality .... How do you ... ? I don't know

man ....Let them walk the hell out of here. Let them get on that

interstate and walk out .... All you have here is thousands and

thousands of people who have desperate, desperate needs-six days
[after Katrina]! These people are in the same clothes. Where do
you think they are going to the bathroom? They don't wash their
hands ....These babies-what the hell... ? Let them go ....Let
14 9
them walk over this damned interstate and let them out of here.
Shepard Smith also criticized the officers' actions:
[Officials have] watched people being killed around them, and they
[have] watched people starving, and they [have] watched elderly
people not get any medicine .... And you know what they are
doing now ...? [Officers] have set up a checkpoint at the bottom
of this bridge .... It's the only way out ....It's the connection to
the rest of the world .... And anyone who walks up out of that

city . . .is turned around. You are not allowed to go to Gretna,
Louisiana from New Orleans, Louisiana. Over there, there's hope.
Over there, there's electricity. Over there, there's food and water.
But oyou cannot go .... The government will not allow you to do
1

it.

Upon seeing all of the people stranded in and around the bridge,
the media began questioning the officers about what the city was going to do with all of the evacuees. 5 1 "The [officers] responded [that]
they were going to take care of [them]. ' 152 And, just after dusk set in,
the officers did.153 However, as Bradshaw and Slonsky explained, this
time the officers not only forced the group to disperse at gunpoint, the
officers also took the group's food and water:
[A] Gretna Sheriff showed up, jumped out of his patrol vehicle,
aimed his gun at our faces, screaming, 'Get off the [f***ing] freeway.' A helicopter arrived and used the wind from its blades to
blow away our flimsy structures. As we retreated, the sheriff loaded
up his truck with our food and water. Once again, at gunpoint, we
were forced off the freeway .... [W]e scattered once again ...

[and] sought refuge in an abandoned school bus, under the free-

way .... [W]e were hiding from the police and sheriffs ....154

While the Bradshaw and Slonsky account of the Gretna Bridge incident has circulated through the media more than any other story, sev148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Posting of sfsocialists, supra note 19.
Id.
Id.

154. Id.
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eral other evacuees have come forward to share their stories. One
woman described how the police blockade trapped her, her sons, and
her ex-husband in New Orleans.155 Her ex-husband, Otis, had diabetes and was confined to a wheelchair because his leg had been amputated. 156 "Otis had gone without dialysis for five days when [his]
sons... decided to push his wheelchair down the highway in search of
help. '' 157 They walked for miles, but just when they were near
safety-almost across the Gretna Bridge-armed officers made them
turn around. 158 "By the time they made it out of New Orleans...
... and had open
Otis ... had fallen out of his wheelchair three times
159
wounds on his head. He was nearly in a coma.

As the news reports about the bridge incident surfaced, the City of
Gretna was anything but apologetic. Mayor Ronnie Harris said that
Arthur Lawson, chief of the Gretna Police Department, made the decision to block the bridge. 160 But, Harris stated that he supported the
decision "wholeheartedly. ' 161 While police officers later claimed that
"they feared for their personal safety,"' 1 62 immediately after the incident Lawson stated, "Our city was locked down.., for the sake of the
citizens that left their valuables here .... ,,163 And, in another interview Lawson said, "If we had opened the bridge, our city would have
looked like New Orleans does now: looted, burned and pillaged."' 64
City officials admitted that they "turned everyone around-even the
elderly and children-because there might be some bad ap".1.."65
Mayor Harris explained, "I'm sure that there were very
ples .
good people. There were scared people. There were desperate people. And, unfortunately, contained within that crowd was a criminal
element. That criminal element burned, looted, stole, threatened and
terrorized.' 66 Gretna residents proudly supported their city's decision. Residents flagrantly displayed their gratification to the police
officers with "thank you" yard signs, and the city council went as far
as to shamelessly express its formal approval of the officers' actions in
155. Cadenhead, supra note 22.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. The Bridge to Gretna, supra note 21.
161. Id.
162. Jessica Fender, Attorney General Investigating Gunfire at Bridge During Katrina, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Nov. 23, 2005, at B2, available at 2005 WLNR
24898718.
163. CNN.com, supra note 102.
164. Rogers Cadenhead, Police Trapped Thousands in New Orleans,WORKBENCH,
Sept. 9, 2005, http://www.cadenhead.org/workbench/news/2748/police-trappedthousands-new-orleans.
165. The Bridge to Gretna, supra note 21.
1AA
166. Id.
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a city-council resolution.1 67 In further defense of its actions, the City
promised to "secure" the bridge the same way in the next
hurricane.1 68
But there should not be a next time. As the Dickersons' complaint
states, the City of Gretna violated evacuees' constitutional right to the
freedom of movement and travel. 169 The next section of this Comment explains that the freedom to travel is deeply engrained in our
country's history17 ° and that neither the government nor private individuals may engage in conduct that has the sole purpose of prohibiting
travel. 171 The remainder of this Comment analyzes Gretna's actions
in light of this prohibition and argues that both the City of Gretna and
the individual police officers who blocked the Gretna Bridge should
be held liable for their actions.
Our justice system must hold Gretna and its officers accountable.
The Select Committee's report is right: "the learning process is sometimes . . . a [very] painful one." 172 And, we cannot afford to learn
Katrina's lessons twice.
III.

THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO TRAVEL

Free movement... is ...as dangerous to a tyrant as free expression
of ideas or the right of assembly ....[However, while] [t]hose with
the right of free movement use it at times for mischievous purposes[,] ... that is true of many liberties we enjoy. We nevertheless
place our faith in them .. .knowing that the risk of abusing liberty ...is part of the price we pay for this free society .... [For,
[o]nce the right to travel is curtailed, all other rights suffer ....
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
protect fundamental rights and liberties that are "'deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition,' . . . and 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if
they were sacrificed."1 74 While the freedom of travel is not expressly
granted by the Constitution, the Supreme Court has long recognized
167. Id. ("Allowing individuals to enter the city posed an unacceptable risk to the
safety of the citizens of Gretna.").
168. Bruce Hamilton, Bridge Standoff Still Under Scope: Gretna Faces Lawsuit for

Stopping Evacuees, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 4, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 354152.
169. Complaint, supra note 25, at 3-4.
170. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958).
171. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969), overruled in part on other
grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); see Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489,
499 (1999).
172. A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 3, at 9.
173. Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 519-20 (1964) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
174. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (quoting Moore v. City
of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion) and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)); see also Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 418-19
(1981).
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that the freedom of travel is a fundamental right.' 75 In 1849 the Supreme Court stated, "[W]e are one people, with one common country.
We are all citizens of the United States; and, as members of the same
community, must have the right to pass and repass through every part
of it without interruption .... ",176 More recently, the Supreme Court
said that the right to travel freely between states, "which was expressly mentioned in the text of the Articles of Confederation, may
simply have been 'conceived from the beginning to be a necessary
177
concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created.' ,
Thus, even though it is not explicitly recognized in the Constitution,
the right to travel is nonetheless fundamental.1 78 The Supreme Court
has recognized that the right to travel embraces at least three different
components: the right to travel freely between states; "the right to be
treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present" in another state; and, for those who choose to become permanent residents of another state, "the right to be treated
like other citizens of that [s]tate."'1 79 This section focuses on the first
of these rights: the right to travel freely between states. The first part
of this section reviews Supreme Court precedent in the area of interstate passage. The second part of this section considers the boundaries of this right: that is, to what extent may a state curtail an
individual's right to travel when limiting that right is deemed necessary to protect other social and governmental interests?
A.

The Fundamental Right to Interstate Travel

A state may not interfere with a citizen's exercise of, or penalize a
citizen for exercising, the "right to leave one State and enter another."' 80 A state law or state action violates the freedom of travel if
it: (1) actually deters travel, (2) has the primary objective of impeding
travel, or (3) penalizes the exercise of free travel on the basis of impermissible classifications, such as race. 18 ' However, the right to interstate travel is not absolute. Rather, this right only protects
individuals from state regulation or action that unreasonably burdens
or restricts travel. In emergencies, for example, governments may
temporarily limit or suspend the right to travel in the interest of health
and safety. 8 2
175. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105 (1971) ("Our cases have firmly established that the right of interstate travel is constitutionally protected .....
176. Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283, 492 (1849).
177. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501 (1999) (quoting United States v. Guest, 383

U.S. 745, 758 (1966)).
178. Jones, 452 U.S. at 418-19.

179. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500.
180. Jones, 452 U.S. at 419.
181. Att'y Gen. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 903 (1986) (plurality opinion).
182. See United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277, 1280 (4th Cir. 1971).
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If a state enacts a regulation for the sole purpose of inhibiting migration, the regulation is "constitutionally impermissible.,' ' 83 On the
other hand, if a state regulation or state action has the effect of restricting interstate movement, courts consider whether the regulation
84
is reasonable in light of the government's purported interests.1
However, for states, this burden is heavy: regulations that have the
effect of burdening or restricting interstate travel are subject to strict
scrutiny. 185 Under the strict scrutiny test, the law or action must further a compelling state interest. 186 Furthermore, the law or action
must be narrowly tailored to accomplish that particular state interest.1 87 If the law or action sweeps too broadly and places a larger
burden on the right to travel than is necessary in light of the state's
compelling interest, the state law or action is unconstitutional.' 8 8 The
same strict scrutiny test applies to municipalities: if a municipality restricts the right to travel, the municipality must also demonstrate a
compelling interest and show that the action taken by the municipality
was narrowly tailored to meet that compelling interest.' 8 9
In Shapiro v. Thompson, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of statutory provisions from Connecticut, the District of
Columbia, and Pennsylvania, all of which denied welfare assistance to
residents who had not resided in their state for at least one year.' 90
Legislative history from the states' legislatures indicated that the actual objective of the waiting periods was to deter travel:1 9' state welfare agencies feared that, without waiting periods, indigents would
flock to states that provided the most generous benefits.1 92 Thus, the
Supreme Court held that durational residency requirements were
"constitutionally impermissible" because the actual purpose of the re93
quirements was to fence out indigents.1
Despite the fact that the waiting periods were per se unconstitutional, the Court entertained the states' arguments that the legislatures did not intend to fence out indigents.1 94 The states argued that
the legislatures had other important government objectives in mind
183. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969), overruled in part on other
grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
184. See id. at 634.
185. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 499, 504 (1999).
186. See id. at 499; Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 638.
187. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 499; Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 637.
188. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 638; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) ("[E]ven
though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot
be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end
can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be
viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.").
189. See Voorhees v. Shull, 686 F. Supp. 389, 393 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
190. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 618, 621-22.
191. Id. at 628.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 631.
194. Id. at 633-34.
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when they created the waiting-period requirements and that these interests justified the resulting burden on travel.' 9 5 According to the
states, the waiting periods: (1) facilitated the planning of the welfare
budget; (2) provided an objective test of residency; (3) minimized
fraud; and (4) encouraged new residents to enter the labor force
quickly.' 9 6 Because the statutory classifications touched on the fundamental right to travel, the Court said that the states had to show more
than a rational basis for the waiting periods; instead, the states had to
197
show that the waiting periods promoted a compelling state interest.
The Court determined that the states' justifications were not
1 98
compelling.
First, the argument that the waiting periods facilitated budget planning was unfounded because the states had not presented evidence to
show that they used the one-year requirement to predict their welfare
budgets. 199 But, even if the states did use the requirement to predict
their budgets, the predictions would be very unreliable because they
would not account for the long-term residents who continued to receive payments.2 0° Second, the Court said that the waiting periods did
not increase administrative efficiency, as asserted by the states.20 ' The
waiting-period requirements and the residency requirements were independent of each other, and because welfare authorities conducted
extensive background checks to determine whether each prerequisite
had been satisfied, the authorities would have had the information to
determine residency without referring to the waiting-period requirement. 0 2 Third, the states' interests in safeguarding against welfare
fraud did not justify the waiting requirements. 0 3 Because less drastic
means were available to minimize fraud, attempting to prevent fraud
"by the blunderbuss method of denying assistance to all indigent newcomers" was unreasonable. 0 4 Furthermore, this method would be
inefficient because it would only address fraud committed by newcomers; and, presumably, states would have an equal interest in preventing fraud committed by both new and long-time residents.20 5 Finally,
the Court said that the states' interests in encouraging residents to join
the workforce were not sufficiently compelling because the states had
an interest in encouraging all residents-new and old-to join the
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id.

638.
633-38.
634.
635.
636.
637.
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workforce. 20 6 Thus, the waiting requirements were an under-inclusive
means of achieving the workforce objective.2 °7
While the focus in Shapiro was on state regulations that deter
travel, conduct that has the purpose of impeding travel on highways
and other instruments of interstate commerce is also unconstitutional-even if the actor is not a state actor.20 8 In U.S. v. Guest, the
Supreme Court considered the right to travel in the context of a criminal conspiracy by non-state actors to prevent African-Americans from
traveling on highways. The prosecution alleged that the defendants
conspired to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate African-Americans with the intent of impeding their right to travel freely between
states and their right to use the highways and other instruments of
interstate commerce.20 9 Specifically, the defendants attempted to impede travel by, among other things, shooting, beating, and killing African-American travelers; damaging and destroying the property of
African-Americans; and pursuing African-Americans in automobiles
and threatening them with guns. 210 The Court said that while an action that merely has the effect of deterring travel is not necessarily
unconstitutional, if the predominant purpose of the action "is to impede or prevent the exercise of the right of interstate travel, or to
oppress a person because of his exercise of that right," the action is
constitutionally impermissible.2 1 1 The Court explained that "[t]he
constitutional right to travel from one State to another ... necessarily
[includes the right] to use the highways and other instrumentalities of
interstate commerce .... 212 Of course, unlike Shapiro, in Guest the
defendants were not state actors; however, in a footnote, the Court
explained that the "constitutional right of interstate travel is a right
secured against interference
from any source whatever, whether gov' 213
ernmental or private.
B.

The Right to Travel in the Midst of Domestic Emergencies

While the right to travel is fundamental, it is not absolute.2 14 The
right to travel is subject to reasonable regulation such as restrictions
on the time, place, and manner of travel. 21' As this section discusses,
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. at 637-38.
Id.
See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966).
Id. at 748 n.1.
Id.
Id. at 760.
Id. at 757.
Id. at 759 n.17.
See Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 419 (1981).
See United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir. 1971).
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the right to travel may be temporarily limited or even suspended in
the context of a domestic emergency.2 16
In Korematsu v. United States,21 7 the Supreme Court said, "[t]he liberty of every American citizen freely to come and to go must fre"..."218
quently, in the face of sudden danger, be temporarily limited .
States retain broad discretion in exercising their police powers to pass
laws that protect public health and safety. 219 In the context of a domestic emergency, courts recognize that extreme action is often "nec22 0
essary to protect the public from immediate and grave danger.,
Because states must act swiftly and do not have the same benefit of
retrospection that judges have, courts are very reluctant to substitute
their judgment for that of a state's. 22 ' Thus, when evaluating emergency actions that incidentally affect fundamental rights, courts will
uphold the action if the state's emergency powers "appear to have
been reasonably necessary for the preservation of order. '222 Generally, the emergency action is acceptable if the state acts in good faith
and has a factual basis for deciding that the restrictions are necessary
to maintain order.2 2 3 Furthermore, in choosing how to preserve order, the state must choose the least drastic means available. 2 4
In particular, in a domestic emergency, limitations on travel are
often necessary. For example, if a natural disaster has caused an area
to become hazardous and uninhabitable, the government may ban
travel into that area to protect the health and safety of citizens.2 25 In
Zemel v. Rusk,22 6 the court stated that "[t]he right to travel ... is of
course ... constitutionally protected .... But that freedom does not
mean that areas ravaged by flood, fire[,] or pestilence cannot be quarantined when . . . travel to the area would directly and materially interfere with the safety and welfare of the area or the Nation as a
216. See generally Smith v. Avino, 91 F.3d 105 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that a Governor's Executive Order imposing a curfew after a hurricane was constitutional) abrogated on other grounds by Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
217. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
218. Id. at 231 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
219. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905).
220. Moorhead v. Farrelly, 723 F. Supp. 1109, 1112-13 (D.V.I. 1989).
221. United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277, 1281 (4th Cir. 1971).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See id. at 1283.
225. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1965).
226. In Zemel, the plaintiff argued that the Secretary of State violated his right to
travel when, for reasons of national security, the Secretary of State refused to validate
the plaintiff's passport for travel to Cuba. Id. at 3-4. The Court stated, "the fact that
a liberty cannot be inhibited without due process of law does not mean that it can
under no circumstances be inhibited." Id. at 14. Because travel to Cuba "might involve the Nation in dangerous international incidents," the Court held that the Constitution did not require the Secretary of State to validate passports for travel to
Cuba. Id. at 15.
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whole. '227 Aside from limiting travel into a dangerous area, during
domestic emergencies states may invoke their police powers to implement and enforce curfews. Because the Supreme Court has correlated
the freedom of speech to the freedom of travel, 228 several federal appellate courts have justified travel restrictions as "reasonable limitations" under the First Amendment's "time, place, and manner"
doctrine. 229 As illustrated in Chalk v. United States, in the context of
domestic emergencies courts will almost always affirm that restrictions
230
on the time and place of travel are "reasonable limitations.
In Chalk v. United States, the Fourth Circuit upheld as constitutional a curfew imposed by the mayor of Asheville, North Carolina
after a battle broke out between police officers and African-American
students at a local high school.23 1 The mayor issued a state of emergency in accordance with state law.23 2 Under his emergency authority,
the mayor imposed a nighttime curfew from 9 p.m. to 6 a.m. for three
days.2 33 One day after the mayor imposed the curfew, a highway patrol officer stopped Chalk and placed him under arrest for violating
the curfew.23 4 Subsequently, a search of Chalk's car revealed a shotgun, a roll of dynamite, and bomb-making materials.2 3 5 Chalk contended that the search of his car was unlawful because absent "the
mayor's overbroad and unlawful restrictions," the officer would not
have stopped Chalk's car.236 First, Chalk argued that the statutory
scheme, which authorized the mayor to declare the state of emergency, was unconstitutional because it infringed on the fundamental
right to travel.2 3 7 Second, Chalk argued that the threat to public
safety was not sufficient for the mayor to impose the emergency
restriction.2 3 8
The court said that the challenge to the constitutionality of the statute was without merit because controlling civil disorders that have the
potential to threaten the state are within the police powers of the government.2 39 Under these police powers, the state has "broad discretion" to decide what is necessary in an emergency situation. 240 While
227. Id. at 15-16.
228. Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 517 (1964).
229. See Chalk, 441 F.2d at 1283; see also Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 269 (3d
Cir. 1990) (relying on time, place, and manner doctrine to regulate public travel).
230. Chalk, 441 F.2d at 1283; see also Lutz, 899 F.2d at 269 (allowing intermediate
scrutiny of time, place, and manner restrictions on localized travel).
231. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277.
232. Id. at 1278.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1278-79.
236. Id. at 1280.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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"[t]he invocation of emergency powers necessarily restricts activities
that would normally be constitutionally protected[,]" restrictionslike curfews-that have incidental affects on fundamental rights are
nonetheless valid if the declared state of emergency and the associated
restrictions "appear to have been reasonably necessary for the preservation of order."' 24 ' However, the court said that a mayor's decision
to invoke emergency measures is not free from judicial review.24 2 The
scope of judicial review is limited to whether the mayor took the actions in good faith and whether the mayor had a factual basis for de243
ciding that the restrictions were necessary to maintain order.
Because dealing with emergency situations "requires an immediacy of
action that is not possible for judges," the court said that substituting
its own judgment for that of the mayor's would be highly
inappropriate.2 4 4
Upon reviewing the mayor's actions, the court said that the mayor
made the decision to impose emergency restrictions in good faith after
considering many facts:2 45 the battle with officers involved a large
group of students; the battle resulted in physical injury and property
damage; and, based on public meetings the mayor had attended prior
to the incident, the mayor believed that tensions in the community
were high.24 6 Furthermore, the curfew did not unnecessarily restrict
the right to travel.24 7 The court said that the "freedom of travel[,] like
[the] freedom of speech[, is] subject to reasonable limitations as to
time and place.' ' 248 Because the curfew was in effect city-wide, and
was not limited to black neighborhoods, the restriction was not "immediately suspect" as being racially motivated.2 49 Moreover, the
mayor limited the curfew to nighttime hours; thus, it was not overly
burdensome. 250 Noting that research has shown that nighttime curfews can be an effective means of controlling civil disorders, the court
said that it could not conclude that the curfew was unnecessary, or
that less extreme measures would have been sufficient to restore
order.2 5 '
In Smith v. Avino 2 1 2 decided twenty-five years after Chalk, the
Eleventh Circuit held that a curfew imposed after Hurricane Andrew
241. Id. at 1280-81.
242. Id. at 1281.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 1282.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1283.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Smith v. Avino, 91 F.3d 105 (11th Cir. 1996), abrogatedon other grounds by
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
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was constitutional. 53 In 1992, Hurricane Andrew caused widespread
destruction to Florida homes and businesses, as well as to the infrastructure and to utility services.254 The governor declared a state of
emergency and authorized Miami city and Metropolitan Dade County
officials to implement curfews that required residents to remain in
their homes during specified hours.2 55 The plaintiffs alleged that the
curfew, implemented by the county manager, was unconstitutional because it was vague and overly broad.2 5 6 The court said that the state
properly exercised its police powers by imposing a curfew, even
though the curfew curtailed movement that would otherwise be free
from restriction. 5 7 Using the same test that the Fourth Circuit used in
Chalk, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the constitutionality of the curfew by evaluating whether the county manager took the actions in
good faith and whether the county manager had a factual basis for
deciding that the restrictions were necessary to maintain order.25 8 The
plaintiffs conceded that the curfew was necessary, and the plaintiffs
never alleged that the city manager acted in bad faith. 259 Furthermore, the plaintiffs conceded that the state and the city manager had a
factual basis for the decision to impose the curfew.2 60 However, the
plaintiffs argued that the curfew was unconstitutionally vague because
it failed to advise residents of the parameters of their right to travel.26 '
Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the curfew was unconstitutional
"because 2 62it did not contain 'built-in exceptions' for necessary
activity."
The Eleventh Circuit held that the curfew did not unduly burden
the right to travel.26 3 First, the court pointed out that, in fact, the curfew did allow for exceptions: police officers were given guidelines to
permit travel for medical reasons or for responsibilities related to
work or school. 2 64 The court noted that "[f]lexibility in any such curfew is a key ingredient to provide the enforcing authorities with the
practical ability to carry out the purpose[ ]" of the curfew.2 6 5 Second,
the court said that the length of the curfew was tailored to the nature
and exigency of the emergency. 6 6
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Id. at 107.
Id. at 108.
Id.
Id. at 107.
See id. at 109.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting State v. Boles, 240 A.2d 920, 923 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1967)).
See id. at 109-10.
Id. at 109.
Id.
Id. at 110.
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In Lutz v. York, decided four years before Avino, the Third Circuit
similarly held that a cruising ordinance was a reasonable restriction on
the time, place, and manner of travel.2 6 7 While Lutz did not involve a
domestic emergency, the case further illustrates the latitude that local
officials have in regulating the time, place, and manner of travelespecially when the regulations are implemented to protect the health
and safety of a community. The city ordinance in question prohibited
cruising-driving past clearly-identified locations more than two
times- in a particular part of York, Pennsylvania.2 6 According to
legislative history, the legislators thought the ordinance would reduce
dangerous traffic congestion, excessive noise and pollution, and insure
sufficient access for emergency vehicles to and through city thoroughfares.2 6 9 Unlike Chalk and Avino, the plaintiff in Lutz claimed that
the cruising ordinance unnecessarily burdened his right to intrastate
travel.2 70
To address the plaintiff's claim, the court turned first to the issue of
"whether there exists an unenumerated constitutional right of intrastate travel. '27 1 The Third Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme
Court has never recognized a fundamental right to intrastate travel;
however, it noted that a few old Supreme Court cases contain dicta
suggesting that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment substantively protects the right to intrastate travel. 272 Specifically, in Williams v. Fears,27 3 the Supreme Court said that "the right of
locomotion, the right to remove from one place to another according
to inclination, is an attribute of liberty ...secured by the 14th amendment. '2 74 Thus, the Third Circuit held that the right to intrastate
travel is fundamental. The court then proceeded to decide what level
of scrutiny to apply.27 5
The court said that "[n]ot every governmental burden on fundamental rights must survive strict scrutiny. ' 2 76 Instead, the Third Circuit turned to the "time, place, and manner" doctrine associated with
the fundamental right to free speech.2 7 7 The court said that just like
the freedom of speech "cannot conceivably imply the right to speak
whenever, wherever and however one pleases-even in public fora
specifically used for public speech-so too the right to travel cannot
conceivably imply the right to travel whenever, wherever and however
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 270 (3d Cir. 1990).
Id. at 257.
Id.
Id. at 270.
Id. at 256.
Id. at 266-67.
Id. (citing Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270 (1900)).
Id.
Id. at 268-69.
Id. at 269.
Id.
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21 7 8
one pleases-even on roads specifically designed for public travel.
Unlimited access to roadways would result in chaos; thus, state and
local governments must have some flexibility in regulating the instrumentalities of travel. 279 Therefore, under the time, place, and manner
doctrine, the court said that the ordinance was subject to intermediate
scrutiny and would be upheld if it was narrowly tailored to meet significant-not necessarily compelling-city objectives, while still leaving open alternative channels of travel.28 ° The court pointed out that,
unlike strict scrutiny, the intermediate scrutiny standard does not require that the state employ the least restrictive means of achieving its
end. 281 Furthermore, in a footnote, the court emphasized that not all
traffic regulations are subject to intermediate scrutiny; rather, only
nontrivial traffic regulations deserve this level of scrutiny. 8 2
The Third Circuit concluded that York's cruising ordinance was a
reasonable time, place, and manner restriction on localized intrastate
travel. 2 3 York had a significant interest in ensuring public safety and
reducing congestion caused by cruising.2 8 4 Moreover, the ordinance
was limited in scope: it was limited to only those locations that were
undisputedly affected by the cruising problem; it left open "ample alternative routes" to travel around the city without difficulty; it prohibited only certain repetitive driving in one area of the city; and it did
not prohibit travel into or out of the problem areas altogether. 8 5
Thus, the city narrowly tailored the ordinance to combat the safety
and congestion problems.28 6
As Chalk, Avino, and Lutz illustrate, the right to travel-either interstate or intrastate-is not absolute, and state and local governments may impose reasonable regulations. In domestic emergencies,
local governments will have significantly wider latitude in implementing restrictions that affect the right to travel because emergency situations usually require swift action to protect the public from immediate
and grave danger.2 8 7 Regulations cannot be unduly burdensome on
the right to travel: regulations must be narrowly tailored to achieve
the governmental interest, and, in domestic emergencies, the government must choose means that are no more burdensome than necessary to deal with the emergent circumstances.2 8 8 However, even when

278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 270.
281. Id. at 269-70.
282. Id. at 270 n.41 ("Nothing we say today suggests that more conventional traffic
regulations such as speed limits, stop signs, and the like need now be subjected to
heightened judicial scrutiny.").
283. Id. at 270.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. See United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277, 1280 (4th Cir. 1971).
288. Id. at 1280-83.
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danger is not imminent, local governments are afforded leeway in regulating the time, place, and manner of travel if the purpose of the
289 Imregulation is to protect the health and safety of the community.
portant to note is the fact that Chalk, Avino, and Lutz all dealt with
regulations that affected local movement. While, unlike Lutz, the
courts in Chalk and Avino did not specifically make a distinction between interstate and intrastate travel, the curfews arguably had a
more direct impact on local travel. Furthermore, in none of these
cases was travel completely cut off: the curfews limited only the timing
of travel, and the cruising ordinance limited only the amount of driving in particular locations.
While the government is permitted to restrict travel in the aftermath of a natural disaster, the government should not restrict an individual's right to travel when it is necessary for self-preservation. 2 9 In
Zemel, the court said that the freedom of travel could be limited when
travel into an area would be dangerous to the safety and welfare of the
area or the Nation as a whole; 29 1 but, the court did not say that restricting people from leaving a disaster area would be constitutional.
An individual should have the opportunity to make choices in pursuit
of self-preservation as long as those choices do not harm the safety or
welfare of the community.2 9 2
In Chalk, the Fourth Circuit said, "[t]he courts cannot prevent
abuse of power, but [they] can sometimes correct it. '' 293 As the next
section discusses, when the government unnecessarily infringes upon a
fundamental right, the government may be subject to civil liability;
and, in some circumstances, government actors may be subject to both
civil and criminal liability.
IV.

CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR

CONSTITUTIONAL DEPRIVATIONS

A.

Civil Liability Under 42 U.S. C. § 1983

Congress has the power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendmentincluding the right to travel-against state officials "who carry a
badge of authority. '294 Congress created the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
the predecessor to § 1983, to provide a remedy to anyone from whom
the government has deprived a constitutional right.2 9 5 The Act was
born out of distrust: Congress "was concerned that state instrumental289. See Lutz, 899 F.2d at 269-70.
290. See L.R. McInnis, The Municipal Management of Emergencies: The Houston
Plan, 4 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 139, 146 (1999).
291. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1965).
292. See id.
293. Chalk, 441 F.2d at 1280.
294. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-72 (1961), overruled in part on other
grounds by Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
295. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1979).
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ities could not protect [federally created] rights [and] it realized that
state officers might, in fact, be antipathetic to the vindication of those
rights. '29 6 Congress's purpose was to assign the federal courts with
"guardians[hip] of the people's federal rights-to protect the people
from unconstitutional action under color of state law."' 29 7 While
§ 1983 provides a remedy for constitutional infringements, it is not a
source of substantive rights in itself; a plaintiff cannot bring a suit
under § 1983 without first establishing that the defendant deprived the
plaintiff of a constitutional right.29 8 Section 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory. . . , subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution ... shall be liable to the party injured ..... 29
In an action for relief under § 1983, the plaintiff must establish: (1)
that he or she was deprived of a constitutional right, and (2) that the
person who deprived the plaintiff of his or her constitutional right was
acting under the color of state law.3 °°
1. Civil Liability for Municipalities
Under § 1983, municipalities are considered "persons"; thus, a
plaintiff may sue government actors in their individual capacities for
the actor's own actions as well as municipalities for the actions of their
employees. 30 1 To establish a municipality's liability for the acts of an
employee, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the employee deprived the
plaintiff of a constitutional right; (2) the employee's "action... implement[ed] or execute[d] a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or
decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers; ' 30 2 and (3) that the policy was the "moving force" behind-or
the cause of-the deprivation.30 3
In Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services,3 °4 the
Supreme Court made clear that municipalities cannot be held liable
under § 1983 unless the action in question is taken pursuant to official
municipal policy.30 5 However, subsequently in Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati,3 ° 6 the Supreme Court explained that "official policy" includes more than just formal rules; it also includes courses of action
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
Id.
Chapman, 441 U.S. at 617-18.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999).
See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
Id. at 690.
Id. at 694.
Monell, 436 U.S. 658.
Id. at 691.
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
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that government decision makers adopt or authorize.3 °7 Moreover, an
official municipal policy may be a single decision that arises in and is
tailored to a particular situation.3 °8
To prove that a municipal policy caused the constitutional deprivation in issue, a plaintiff must establish that the cause was either direct
or indirect, following the tort principles of cause-in-fact and proximate
cause. 30 9 Thus, causation may be direct where a state policy-on its
face-directs the harm suffered by the plaintiff; or, causation may be
indirect where the harm the plaintiff
suffers is the natural conse3 10
quence of the state law or policy.
While its criminal counterpart, 18 U.S.C. § 242, contains a state-ofmind requirement, § 1983 does not require proof of bad intentions:
"clear[ly] .. .one reason [that] the legislation was passed was . ..
because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the
enjoyment of rights, privileges and immunities . . . might be denied ... "311 There are circumstances, which will not be discussed in
this Comment, where a plaintiff may nonetheless have to establish
some form of culpability to make a case under § 1983. For example, a
plaintiff may have to establish that a municipality acted with "deliberate indifference" if it did not formally approve a law or policy, 312 but
where the municipality's inaction indicates implied approval.3 1 3 Another example where culpability may be required is where the underlying constitutional claim that permits a plaintiff to seek a remedy
under § 1983 requires culpable conduct.3 14
2.

Civil Liability for State Actors: Qualified Immunity

To hold a state actor individually liable under § 1983, a plaintiff
must be able to circumvent the hurdle of qualified immunity; to do
this, the plaintiff must establish that the state actor had fair warning
that his or her actions were unlawful but acted anyway.31 5 While
§ 1983 does not accord immunity to municipalities, 3 16 qualified immunity may shield an individual government actor from liability if the
actor's conduct does not violate a clearly established right; however, a
government actor will not escape liability if a reasonable person in the
same circumstances would clearly realize that the conduct is unlaw307. Id. at 480-81.
308. Id. at 480.
309. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 384 (1976).
310. See Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 376 (4th Cir. 1984).
311. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961), overruled in part on other grounds
by Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
312. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
313. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994).
314. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845-54 (1998).
315. See Hope v. Peizer, 536 U.S. 730, 740 (2002).
316. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 639-40 (1980).
158

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol13/iss1/6
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V13.I1.5

32

Eaton: Escape Denied: The Gretna Bridge and the Government’s Armed Block

2006]THE GRETNA BRIDGE IN THE WAKE OF KATRINA 159
ful.A 7 The policy behind qualified immunity is to ensure that state
actors are not individually held liable for their unlawful actions unless
the actors had fair warning that their conduct would subject them to
liability.3 18 However, in United States v. Lanier,3 "9 the Court made
clear that even where the circumstances are novel, officials can still be
aware that their conduct is unlawful.3 20 While cases that are "fundamentally similar" or have "materially similar" facts can strongly support that the law is clearly established, the more important question is
"whether the state of the law ...

gave [the defendants] fair warning

3 21
that their alleged [conduct] was unconstitutional.
While municipalities may be liable for compensatory damages
under § 1983, they cannot be held liable for punitive damages.3 2 2
However, a government actor may be liable for both compensatory
and punitive damages. 323 To establish punitive damages, a plaintiff
must show that the individual defendant acted with reckless or callous
disregard for the plaintiff's rights, or that the defendant intentionally
violated federal law.324 The premise for allowing plaintiffs to collect
punitive awards in suits against individual public officials is closely
tied to the policy behind the fair-warning requirement: individual acactors
tors are less likely to repeat constitutional deprivations if the325
know that they can be held personally liable for their actions.

B.

Criminal Liability Under 18 U.S.C. § 242

Government actors not only may be held civilly liable for constitutional deprivations under § 1983, they may also be held criminally liable for their conduct.3 26 According to § 242, a defendant acting under
"color of law" may be held criminally liable for willfully depriving a
person of his or her constitutional rights. 2 7 Section 242 states: "Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom,
willfully subjects any person... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws
of the United States... shall be fined.., or imprisoned not more than
one year, or both. ' 32 8 Furthermore, § 242 provides for criminal consequences that grow increasingly more severe if the constitutional depri317. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198-99 (2004) (per curiam) (citing Saucier
v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001)).
318. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 739-40.
319. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997).
320. Hope, 536 U.S. at 741 (citing Lanier, 520 U.S. at 268).
321. Id. at 741.
322. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 267-70 (1981).
323. Id.
324. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51 (1983).
325. Newport, 453 U.S. at 269-70.
326. See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2000).
327. Id.
159
328. Id.
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vation results in bodily harm or death.32 9 If the conduct results in
bodily injury, or if the conduct involves "the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of a dangerous weapon," the defendant may be fined
as well as imprisoned for up to ten years.3 30 Moreover, if the defendant's conduct results in death, or if the defendant's conduct includes
a fine as well as a senan attempt to kill, the defendant may receive
33 1
tence of up to life in prison, or even death.
The elements that the prosecution must establish under § 242 are
very similar to the elements required under § 1983. The principal difference is that, under § 242, the prosecution must establish that the
defendant acted willfully-that is, that the defendant acted with the
specific intent to deprive the victim of a constitutional right.33 2 Section 242 includes the same "color of law" requirement as § 1983. 333
While, unlike § 1983, § 242 does not provide for a private cause of
action, the consequences under § 242 can be much harsher-criminal
consequences can include a fine, imprisonment, or even death.33 4
Criminal charges brought under § 242 will support a conviction if the
charges are proven beyond a reasonable doubt.3 35
1. Specific Intent
In Screws v. United States,33 6 the Supreme Court explained the specific intent required under § 242. 3 3 ' A defendant acts with specific
intent if he or she acts willfully-that is, if the defendant acts with the
"purpose to deprive a person of a specific constitutional right. ' 338 The
dispositive issue is not whether a defendant has a bad purpose; rather,
the important issue is whether the person "acts in defiance of announced rules of law."'33 9 An example given by the Third Circuit in
United States v. Delerme3 40 best illustrates the difference between an
officer who merely "goes too far" in carrying out his or her duties, and
one who acts with the purpose of depriving someone of a constitutional right. 34 ' The court said:
It is one thing to be guilty of excessive force, and thus chargeable
with violating the law of the state and territory; it is quite another
for a policeman to administer a physical beating [for the purpose of]
punish[ing an individual] for allegedly breaking the law. In the lat329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 760 (1966).
See 18 U.S.C. § 242.
See id.
See United States v. Cross, 899 F. Supp. 1410, 1413 (W.D. Pa. 1995).
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
Id.
Id. at 101.
Id. at 104.
United States v. Delerme, 457 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1972).
Id. at 161.
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ter case the police officer has acted as prosecutor, judge, and jury;
he has brought the342charges, found the suspect guilty, and administered punishment.
In United States v. Shafer,3 43 a case that involved the shooting of
several university students by National Guard officials, a district court
in Ohio also offered a helpful explanation of the specific intent that is
required under § 242:
If the defendants fired their weapons out of fear, anger, or frustration, then their actions may be cognizable under the State criminal
code. If, and only if they fired with the specific intent to deprive the
students of a right secured by the Constitution (e.g. trial by jury),
may culpability be found under § 242.
Generally, proving willfulness under § 242 is not difficult because it
"can easily be inferred from the egregious circumstances. '345 Relevant circumstances that a court should consider include: whether the
"defendant ha[d] pre-existing malice toward his victim, deprived him
of his rights at close range with weapons designed to beat or maim,
continued his assault for some time, and acted without any
provocation.346
2.

Fair Notice

A defendant cannot be convicted under § 242 unless the defendant
had "fair warning"-by either specific provisions of a law or court
decisions interpreting the law-that the defendant's conduct would violate constitutional rights. 347 However, the Supreme Court has made
clear that "general statements of the law are not inherently incapable
of giving fair and clear warning, and in other instances a general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law may apply with
obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question," even where a
court has not held that the precise conduct is unlawful. 348 The Supreme Court discussed this requirement in United States v. Lanier,3 4 9
in the context of a sexual assault charge under § 242. In Lanier, a
state judge was charged with sexually assaulting five women-one of
whom had divorce and custody proceedings that were still subject to
Lanier's jurisdiction.3 50 The prosecution alleged that the defendant,
while acting under color of state law in his judicial capacity, had willfully deprived his victims of their constitutional right to liberty.3 5 1
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.

Id.
United States v. Shafer, 384 F. Supp. 496, 500 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
Id. at 502.
Id. at 500.
Id.
See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 268-69 (1997).
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
Lanier, 520 U.S. at 259.
Id. at 261.
Id. at 261-62.
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Before trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment and
claimed that § 242 was void for vagueness.3 5 2 The defendant argued
that he did not have "fair warning" that he could be held criminally
liable for his conduct under § 242.
While the Sixth Circuit had reversed the defendant's sentence, holding that the defendant did not have "fair warning" specific enough to
the circumstances of his case, the Supreme Court disagreed.3 54 The
Court said that the "fair warning" standard is the same standard used
to determine qualified immunity under § 1983-the "clearly established" standard.3 5 5 Under these standards, neither a Supreme Court
decision nor an extreme level of factual specificity is necessary to afford a defendant sufficient warning. 3 56 Rather, liability may be imposed for a constitutional deprivation if pre-existing law, including
prior court decisions, gave reasonable warning that the defendant's
conduct violated constitutional rights.35 7 For example, the Supreme
Court noted that while United States v. Guest was the first case to address the deprivation of the right to travel by private persons, fair
warning was established by prior cases that set out the right of interstate travel in general.358 The Court said, "[g]eneral statements of the
'359
law are not inherently incapable of giving fair and clear warning.
Furthermore, "a general constitutional rule already identified in the
decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct
in question, even though 'the very action in question has not previ36
ously been held unlawful.' ,, o
In sum, a state actor may be criminally liable for his or her acts
committed under "color of law." While § 242 is significantly similar to
§ 1983, if a prosecutor can prove that the defendant acted "willfully"
and also show that the defendant had "fair warning" that the conduct
in issue would likely subject the defendant to liability, the defendant
could face much harsher consequences than he or she would otherwise face under § 1983 alone.3 6 1

V.

THE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE
GRETNA BLOCKADE

Lincoln said this Nation was "conceived in liberty and dedicated to
the proposition that all men are created equal .... " [This Nation]
cannot endure if [it] falls short on the guarantees of liberty, justice,
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.

Id. at 262.
See id.
Id. at 268.
Id. at 270-71.
See id. at 268-71.
Id. at 271-72.
Id. at 269-70.
Id. at 271.
Id. (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2000).
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and equality .... But it also cannot endure if we allow our precious
heritage of ordered liberty to be ripped apart amid the sound and
fury of our time.362
The City of Gretna and the individual police officers who blocked
the Gretna Bridge violated Katrina evacuees' constitutional right to
the freedom of interstate travel and should be held civilly liable;
moreover, the individual officers should also be held criminally liable.
The sole purpose of the Gretna policy, and the intent of the officers
who enforced the Gretna policy, was to prevent Katrina evacuees
from crossing the Gretna Bridge-an objective that is constitutionally
impermissible.3 63 While the City of Gretna should be afforded latitude for its decision-making because the policy was made in the midst
of emergency conditions, the policy was not a reasonable limitation on
the evacuees' right to travel. First, the policy was not necessary to
preserve order. Even if the city believed that it had a factual basis for
the decision to implement the policy, and even if the city implemented
the policy in good faith, the city took measures that were too drastic.
Latitude is generally afforded to cities in emergency conditions because courts understand that cities have to act quickly to protect
health and safety. However, Gretna and its officers did not protect
Katrina's victims. Instead, the city implemented a policy that protected property interests at the expense of lives. As a result of the
officers' actions, the suffering of the already weary and distraught
evacuees was further prolonged. And, some evacuees, who otherwise
might have survived, died. While plausible, less restrictive alternatives
to Gretna's decision existed, the city chose instead to take measures
that unnecessarily and unreasonably infringed on the evacuees' right
to escape the horrid conditions and survive. Because the city's actions
violated evacuees' constitutional rights, and because the police officers acted pursuant to a city policy, the city and the officers should
be held civilly liable under § 1983 for their actions. Furthermore, because the individual officers acted willfully and with the specific intent
to impede evacuees from crossing the bridge, the officers should be
held criminally liable under § 242.
A.

The Fundamental Right to Travel Across the Gretna Bridge
The City of Gretna and the individual police officers violated New
Orleans residents' right to the freedom of travel because their actions
had the primary objective of impeding travel across the Gretna
Bridge-a federal highway.3 64 Moreover, even though the policy was
implemented in the midst of an emergency, the policy was not a reasonable limitation on evacuees' rights to travel. Given Gretna's pur362. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 348 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
363. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969), overruled in part on other
grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
364. See Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 418-19 (1981).
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365
pose behind blocking the bridge-protecting residents' property the city's policy was too drastic. Instead of creating a policy out of
concern for the health and safety of people, Gretna attempted to protect property at the expense of lives. 366 Furthermore, Gretna had alternatives-alternatives that would have allowed Gretna to protect
property without risking the lives of thousands of evacuees.
As the Supreme Court held in Shapiro, a state regulation that has
the sole purpose of inhibiting migration is constitutionally impermissible.3 67 Furthermore, in Guest the Supreme Court specifically held
that purposefully impeding travel on highways is unconstitutional. 368
The Gretna policy clearly had the purpose of impeding travel on an
interstate highway. The city used physical force to prevent evacuees
from crossing the Gretna Bridge because the city feared that the evacuees would cause property damage.36 9 Chief Lawson stated: "Our city
was locked down ... for the sake of the citizens that left their valuables here. ... "370 "If we had opened the bridge, our city would have
37
looked like New Orleans does now: looted, burned and pillaged." '
The City of Gretna felt that "securing" the bridge would prevent this
property damage. Impeding travel was not merely an effect of
Gretna's policy; blocking the bridge was the policy. Thus, Gretna's
policy to block the bridge was per se unconstitutional.
Because cities affected by Katrina were in the midst of an emergency, city officials had broad discretion to exercise authority to protect the health and safety of residents.3 7 2 The City of Gretna had
authority to take action that was reasonably necessary to preserve order, even if the action consequently infringed on fundamental
rights.3 7 3 However, Gretna's actions were not necessary to preserve
order. Whether Gretna made its decision in good faith, based on facts
that indicated that the restrictions were necessary, is arguable. In
Smith v. .Alvino, the Eleventh Circuit upheld a county-wide curfew
after a hurricane because the curfew did not unnecessarily infringe on
residents' rights to travel: the curfew was implemented in good faith

365. CNN.com, supra note 102.
366. Id.
367. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969), overruled in part on other
grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
368. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966).
369. See Nicholas Riccardi, After Blocking the Bridge, Gretna Circles the Wagons,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2005. After a fire broke out at a local mall, Mayor Harris "had
had enough," stating, "I am not going to give up our community." Id. Harris called
the state police and the next morning, fearing that more property damage would ensue, Gretna Police Chief Arthur Lawson made the decision to seal the Gretna Bridge.
Id.
370. CNN.com, supra note 102.
371. Cadenhead, supra note 164.
372. See Smith v. Avino, 91 F.3d 105, 109 (11th Cir. 1996) abrogated on other
grounds by Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
373. See id.
164
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and the decision was based on information that indicated the action
was necessary to maintain order. 37" Furthermore, based on the facts
noted by the court, the curfew was flexible, and the length of the curfew was tailored to the nature of the emergency.3 75
Unfortunately, Gretna's decision was drastically different. The circumstances indicate that Gretna's decision to block the Gretna Bridge
may not have been made in good faith. First, while more recently
Gretna asserted that its reason for blocking the bridge was to protect
the safety of its residents,37 6 comments made by city officials during
the blockade and immediately thereafter indicate that protecting the
safety of its residents was not Gretna's true purpose. Police Chief Arthur Lawson announced on CNN that the officials locked down the
'3 7 7
city "for the sake of the citizens that left their valuables [t]here.
Lawson said that if the city let "these people" in, the city would look
like New Orleans-"burned, looted and pillaged."3'78 Thus, the city's
intention appears not to have been the protection of its residents, but
rather the protection of its residents' property.
Second, accounts of the Gretna Bridge incident indicate that the
37 9
city's and the officers' actions may have been racially motivated.
Given Jefferson Parish's reputation for being "Louisiana's most notoriously racist parish, '38 ° this would not be surprising. Bradshaw and
Slonsky, a white couple, support the contention that the officers' actions appeared to be, at least in part, racially motivated. 381 Furthermore, survivors who testified before the Select Committee repeated
stories of officials' racist behaviors ranging from threats that were accompanied by racial slurs to the priority
status given to white survi382
vors in evacuation transportation.
Even if the city claims that the decision was implemented in good
faith, the city did not have a factual basis for its decision to deprive all
New Orleans residents of their right to travel. While there may have
been evidence of criminal activity in the aftermath of Katrina, there
were no facts from which Gretna could have reasonably inferred that
the entire city of New Orleans was dangerous.
374. Id. at 109-10.
375. See id. at 108 (the curfew was limited to specific hours and to specific geographical areas; furthermore, while the curfew was in place, it "was modified as to
geographical area and time of enforcement," as the emergency circumstances
changed).
376. The Bridge to Gretna, supra note 21; see Fender, supra note 162.
377. CNN.com, supra note 102.
378. Cadenhead, supra note 164.
379. Posting of sfsocialists, supra note 19 (stating that the "relief effort was callous,
inept, and racist").
380. Cadenhead, supra note 51.
381. Posting of sfsocialists, supra note 19;
382. A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 3, at 458 (supplementary report of Rep.
Cynthia A. McKinney).
R
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In addition, Gretna's actions were not tailored to the emergent circumstances. Gretna's policy swept too broadly, placing a dangerously
larger burden on the right to travel than was necessary under the circumstances. Like Shapiro,where the Supreme Court struck down the
residency requirement that employed a "blunderbuss method of denying [welfare] assistance to all indigent newcomers, 38 3 Gretna's policy
was also overly inclusive. Gretna repeatedly asserted that it decided
to block the bridge to protect the city.38 4 Specifically, the officials said
that they were trying to keep out the "bad apples" '38 5 Yet, the city
admitted that it "turned everyone around-even the elderly and children. '386 Especially troublesome is the fact that many of these people
were ill or had serious health conditions.3 8 7 In Avino, the post-hurricane curfew permitted exceptions for medical reasons.3 88 Gretna's
policy, however, was not only over-inclusive, it was also inflexible because the policy did not allow exceptions for medical emergencies.
Furthermore, Gretna's policy was also under inclusive. The police officers permitted people to drive across the bridge, but they did not
permit people to walk across the bridge.38 9 The officers assumed that
the people driving cars were not criminals even though there was no
evidence for this distinction. In fact, according to Bradshaw and Slon' 390
sky, they watched people steal "any car that could be hotwired.
Thus, not only did Gretna's policy fail to consider that criminals might
be driving cars, Gretna's actions actually encouraged desperate evacuees to engage in criminal behavior so that they could cross the bridge.
Gretna's policy was not just overly-inclusive, it was also overly intrusive because there were plausible alternatives to Gretna's decision
to block the bridge. Instead of blocking the Gretna Bridge, Gretna's
law enforcement could have blocked off roads within Gretna and offered only one route through the city. This would have at least provided an escape route to the evacuees while still keeping Gretna safe.
However, despite plausible alternatives, Gretna endangered the lives
of New Orleans residents by choosing a course of action that unnecessarily burdened the evacuees' right to travel. Because the city took
measures that constituted a larger deprivation of individual liberty
than was necessary, Gretna's actions were unreasonable. 91
383. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 637 (1969), overruled in part on other
grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
384. The Bridge to Gretna, supra note 21; Cadenhead, supra note 164.
385. See The Bridge to Gretna, supra note 21.
386. Id. (emphasis added).
387. Posting of sfsocialists, supra note 19; Cadenhead, supra note 22.
388. Smith v. Avino, 91 F.3d 105, 109 (11th Cir. 1996), abrogatedon other grounds
by Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
389. Posting of sfsocialists, supra note 19.
390. Id.
391. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969), overruled in part on other
grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
166

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol13/iss1/6
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V13.I1.5

40

Eaton: Escape Denied: The Gretna Bridge and the Government’s Armed Block

2006]THE GRETNA BRIDGE IN THE WAKE OF KATRINA

167

Even under the Lutz analysis, which employs intermediate scrutiny
to travel restrictions that regulate the time, place, and manner of
travel, Gretna's actions were unconstitutional. Under Lutz's intermediate-scrutiny analysis, Gretna's actions would have been constitutional if they were narrowly tailored to meet a significant city
objective. But, while Gretna's objective may have been significant, it
was not narrowly tailored. In Lutz, the cruising ordinance was sufficiently tailored because it "le[ft] open ample alternative routes to get
392 However, Gretna blocked off
about town without difficulty ...
the only channel of travel, knowing that there were no other alternative routes to escape New Orleans. Thus, unlike Lutz, Gretna's policy
was not narrowly tailored, and-even under intermediate scrutinythe policy impermissibly infringed on New Orleans residents' rights.
In addition to Gretna's actions, the actions of the individual police
officers were also unconstitutional. As the Supreme Court noted in
Guest, the "constitutional right of interstate travel is a right secured
against interference from any source whatever, whether governmental
or private."3'93 Like the defendants in Guest, who physically impeded
travel on highways by shooting, beating, and killing African-Americans, 394 the Gretna police officers also physically impeded travel
through violent means. The officers demonstrated that they were willing to use deadly force to preserve the blockade: the officers shot their
guns over evacuees' heads and assaulted people who did not back
down.39 5 Further, like Guest, the officers' intent was to prevent travel
on a federal highway; 396 thus, the officers' conduct was per se unconstitutional. The officers' conduct and language clearly indicated that
obstructing travel was their intent: the officers repeatedly announced
that they were blocking the bridge to prevent Gretna from becoming a
Superdome.3 9 7
Finally, while discussing the Equal Protection implications of the
Gretna Bridge incident is not within the scope of this Comment, in
evaluating the reasonableness of blocking the Gretna Bridge, the discriminatory impact of Gretna's actions on African-American, indigent, and disabled residents cannot be ignored. In Shapiro, the
Supreme Court was concerned with the states' intent to "fence out
indigents" because the state statutes had the purpose of discouraging

392. Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 270 (3d Cir. 1990).
393. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759 n.17 (1966).
394. Id. at 748 n.1.
395. First Supplemental and Amending Class Action Complaint, supra note 24, at
2-3.
396. See id. at 2 (stating that the Gretna Bridge is "a federal roadway under the
jurisdiction of the Federal Highway Administration); see also Louisiana at SouthEastRoads.com, supra note 97.
397. The Bridge to Gretna, supra note 21.
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poor people from migrating.3 9 8 Whether Gretna's actual purpose was
to discourage certain categories of people from crossing the bridge is
arguable; however, Gretna's actions certainly had discriminatory consequences. By blocking the bridge, Gretna imposed the most severe
burdens on the neediest residents of New Orleans. Many, if not most,
of the New Orleans residents that remained in the city either did not
have the economic resources to evacuate, or-because they were elderly, sick, or disabled-were unable to evacuate due to their health.3 99
In addition, because cars were allowed to cross the bridge but people
traveling on foot were not, Gretna's policy directly discriminated
against New Orleans residents who did not have cars-over 100,000
people-the majority of whom were low-income residents. 40 0 Furthermore, when the levees failed, the New Orleans neighborhoods
that suffered the worst flooding were predominantly populated by African-American residents. 0 1 Thus, many of the evacuees whose
houses were washed away and whose lives depended on crossing the
Gretna Bridge, were African American.40 2
Because the right to travel is a fundamental right, the City of
Gretna should be held civilly liable for blocking the Gretna Bridge.
Furthermore, because the officers' actions were so egregious, the officers-in their individual capacities-should be held both civilly and
criminally liable for blocking the Gretna Bridge.
B.

Civil Liability for the Officers' Actions

The City of Gretna and the individual officers should be held liable
in a § 1983 lawsuit: pursuant to a city policy, the police officers
blocked the Gretna Bridge depriving New Orleans residents of their
right to travel and seek refuge from their hurricane-ravaged city.
Because municipalities are "persons" under § 1983, the City of
Gretna may be held liable for blocking the Gretna Bridge.40 3 Even
though Gretna's policy had not been formally approved, Chief of Police Arthur Lawson-with the support of the mayor and the city council-handed down the directive to block the Gretna Bridge and used
police officers from three different departments to enforce it. 40 4 Thus,
in enforcing the policy, the police officers were acting on behalf of the
city, under color of law. Mayor Ronnie Harris extinguished any doubt
that the city endorsed the policy when he said that he supported the
398. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969), overruled in part by Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
399. Fussell, supra note 28.
400. See A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 3, at 113 (stating that over 100,000
New Orleans residents do not have means of personal transportation).
401. Id. at 446.
402. Id.
403. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
404. Harris, supra note 16; see also supra note 369 and accompanying text.
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decision "wholeheartedly." ' 5 Further indicating its support of the
policy, the Gretna City Council passed a resolution that stated,
"[a]llowing individuals to enter the city posed an unacceptable risk to
the safety of the citizens of Gretna."406
In addition, the policy was the "moving force" behind, or the cause
of, the evacuees' loss of the freedom to travel. In all likelihood, but
for Arthur Lawson's directive to block the bridge, the New Orleans
residents who attempted to cross the bridge would have been successful. Immediately after Katrina, officers were not blocking the bridge.
The officers did not block the bridge until three days after Katrina
when Gretna city leaders decided to lock down the city to protect residents' property.40 7 Furthermore, by preventing New Orleans residents from crossing the bridge, many evacuees suffered physical
harm-harm from having no access to food and water, no access to
bathrooms, and no access to necessary medications or medical aid.40 8
Thus, the city policy was the direct cause of the evacuees' constitutional deprivation, as well as the cause of the additional, preventable
harm suffered by the evacuees who could not escape.
The individual police officers who blocked the Gretna Bridge
should also be held individually liable for their actions under § 1983.
To prevent the officers from proving the affirmative defense of qualified immunity, the evacuees must argue that the individual officers
violated a clearly-established constitutional right and, therefore, had
"fair warning" that their actions could subject them to liability. 40 9 The
Supreme Court has long recognized that the freedom of travel is a
fundamental right, 4 10 "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,' . . . and 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty ....,411
Moreover, a reasonable person in the same circumstances as the police officers would have realized that this conduct was unlawful: few
people would believe that preventing unarmed, hungry, thirsty, tired,
and ill evacuees from escaping a flooded city-by shooting guns into
the air-was reasonable. The fact that the residents were made to get
off the bridge when the large groups began to attract media attention
indicates
that the officers knew that blocking the bridge was unlawful.4 12 Furthermore, many people that heard about the Gretna Bridge
incident were immediately enraged by the news. The few reporters
405. The Bridge to Gretna, supra note 21.
406. Id.
407. See Riccardi, supra note 369.
408. See Posting of sfsocialists, supra note 19.
409. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
410. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105 (1971) ("Our cases have firmly established that the right of interstate travel is constitutionally protected ....").
411. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (quoting Moore v. City
of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion) and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)); see also Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 418-19
(1981).
412. See Posting of sfsocialists, supra note 19.
1
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that were able to shoot footage of the bridge were irate at the sight,4 13
and members of Congress were so incensed that they passed bills to
condemn the City of Gretna and its officers.4 14 The police department's history of rights violations may have numbed the police officers as to their legal boundaries, but reasonable people in the
officers' situation would have realized that the officers' actions were
clearly unlawful.
While Gretna may be held liable for compensatory damages under
§ 1983,415 the individual police officers who blocked the bridge may be
held liable for both compensatory and punitive damages.4 16 Considering the circumstances, the police officers should have to pay punitive
damages for the harm caused to the Katrina evacuees who could not
escape New Orleans; the officers acted with callous disregard for the
evacuees' rights and violated the clearly-established constitutional
right to the freedom of travel. 417 Furthermore, requiring the officers
to pay punitive damages would promote the important policy underlying any award of punitive damages: in the future, officials will be less
likely to prohibit all travel in the aftermath of a natural disaster if they
know that they can be held personally liable for their actions.4 18
C.

Criminal Liability for the Officers' Actions

Not only should the officers be held civilly liable under § 1983, they
should also be held criminally liable for their actions under § 242. To
establish liability under § 242, prosecutors must establish that the individual police officers, acting under color of law, willfully deprived Katrina evacuees of their right to travel. 41 9 Furthermore, under § 242 the
prosecution will have to show that the police officers had fair warning
that their actions would violate constitutional rights.42 °
Under § 242, the individual police officers should be held liable because they enforced Gretna's directive and willfully deprived New Orleans residents of their right to travel across the Gretna Bridge. As
established in the first two sections of Part V, the officers acted under
color of law and violated the evacuees' right to travel. However, to
prove criminal liability under § 242, the prosecution must also establish that the officers acted willfully-that is, that the officers acted
with the specific intent to prevent New Orleans residents from crossing the bridge.
413. Hannity and Colmes (FOX News Channel television broadcast Sept. 2, 2005),

available at http://homepage.mac.com/mkoldys/iblog/C168863457/E20050902214254/
index.html.
414. H.R. 4209, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. Res. 530, 109th Cong. (2005).
415. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 269-70 (1981).
416. Id.
417. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51 (1983).
418. See City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 269-70.
419. See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1976).
420. See U.S. v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 269 (1997).
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As the Supreme Court pointed out in Delerme and Shafer, if the
officers had simply gone "too far" by, for example, using excessive
force,42 1 or if the officers had simply acted out of fear, anger, or frustration,42 2 the officers would not have had the intent required under
§ 242.423 However, the officers neither acted solely out of fear, anger,
or frustration, nor merely went "too far" in carrying out their duties.
Rather, the officers' specific intent was to prevent the evacuees from
crossing the bridge. The officers repeatedly announced that their purpose was to prevent the evacuees from crossing the bridge: "We're not
going to have any Superdomes over here .... This is not New Orleans
"....
424 By shooting their guns into the air when evacuees approached, the officers demonstrated that they were not afraid to use
their guns and that evacuees who attempted to cross the bridge would
be shot. Their intent to use violence to prevent travel across the
bridge was further demonstrated when officers assaulted several people in front of the growing crowd of stranded evacuees.4 2 5
As the Supreme Court noted in Shafer, proving willfulness under
§ 242 is usually not difficult because it "can easily be inferred from the
egregious circumstances. 4 26 Circumstances indicating willfulness include that the "defendant ha[d] pre-existing malice toward his victim,
deprived him of his rights at close range with weapons designed to
beat or maim, continued his assault for some time, [or] acted without
any provocation. 4 27 Because the police officers' willfulness can easily
be inferred from the circumstances prior to and during the Gretna
Bridge incident, prosecutors should not have a difficult time proving
willfulness.
First, the history of racism within the police department suggests
that the officers may have had "pre-existing malice" towards the black
Katrina evacuees.4 2 8 Second, the officers deprived the evacuees of
their right to travel-oftentimes at close enough range to assault individuals who attempted to cross the bridge-while brandishing machine guns and clutching attack dogs.4 29 Witnesses reported that the
officers fired their weapons, 43 ° "verbally berated and humiliated evacuees," 431 "press[ed] . . .firearms against [evacuees'] bodies, [placed
421. United States v. Delerme, 457 F.2d 156, 161 (3d Cir. 1972).
422. United States v. Shafer, 384 F. Supp. 496, 502 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
423. Id.; Delerme, 457 F.2d at 161.
424. The Bridge to Gretna, supra note 21.
425. See generally First Supplemental and Amending Class Action Complaint,
supra note 24, at 2-3, 5.
426. Shafer, 384 F. Supp. at 500.
427. Id.
428. See A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 3, at 458 (supplementary report of
Rep. Cynthia A. McKinney); Cadenhead, supra note 51; Flaherty, supra note 2.
429. The Bridge to Gretna, supra note 21; Posting of sfsocialists, supra note 19;
Riche, supra note 15.
430. See Posting of sfsocialists, supra note 19.
431. Waterman, supra note 140.
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evacuees into] headlocks and/or chokeholds, and violently thr[ew
evacuees] to the ground."4 '3 2 Third, the officers' conduct continued
for at least two days."33 While in some circumstances two days might
not be a long time, because of the dire circumstances created by Katrina, every hour was crucial. Finally, there is no evidence indicating
that the individuals who were trying to cross the bridge provoked the
officers. Even if the officers felt the need to protect their city's property from the supposed chaos that had broken out in New Orleans, the
injured, hungry, disabled, and elderly people who were trying to cross
the bridge did not provoke the officers' actions. For all of these reasons, a prosecutor should not have a difficult time establishing that the
officers acted willfully.
Finally, as established in the previous section, the officers had "fair
warning" that their actions could subject them to criminal liability: the
Supreme Court has long recognized that the freedom of travel is a
fundamental right. 43" And, several cases have also established that a
willful deprivation of an individual's right to travel can result in criminal liability. 3 5
Because the officers' actions prevented New Orleans residents from
crossing the Gretna Bridge, many residents were stranded in
deplorable conditions with little if any food or water. Evident from
personal accounts and from the recent lawsuit that was filed against
Gretna and the police officers, many of the people that were stranded
were severely harmed or even killed as a result of the officers' conduct.4 36 Thus, because the officers' actions resulted in both bodily
harm and death, the officers' sentences could range anywhere from a
fine, up to life imprisonment, or even death. 3 7
VI.

CONCLUSION

Hurricane Katrina taught our country a number of lessons. As we
witnessed the flight of thousands upon thousands of people from the
uninhabitable city of New Orleans, many Americans asked what went
wrong. Natural disasters and other emergency situations present challenges and demand solutions that aid both the migrants and the areas
affected by the migrants' relocation.438 We, as Americans, cannot allow local government to seek solutions that protect property at the
expense of health and safety.
432. First Supplemental and Amending Class Action Complaint, supra note 24, at
4.
433. Clark, supra note 18.
434. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105 (1971) ("Our cases have firmly established that the right of interstate travel is constitutionally protected .....
435. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966).
436. See Complaint, supra note 25, at 5-6.
437. See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2000).
438. Masters, supra note 14, at 856.
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When news of the Gretna Bridge incident became public, people
were appalled. And, in an attempt to defend its actions, the City of
Gretna boasted that their city made the right decision and would
block the bridge again in the next hurricane. Our justice system must
hold Gretna and its officers accountable. Never again should our people have to suffer like the New Orleans residents suffered in the aftermath of Katrina.
The City of Gretna and the individual police officers who blocked
the Gretna Bridge violated Katrina evacuees' constitutional right to
the freedom of interstate travel and should be held civilly liable;
moreover, the individual officers should also be held criminally liable.
The sole purpose of the Gretna policy, and the intent of the officers
who enforced the Gretna policy, was to prevent Katrina evacuees
from crossing the Gretna Bridge. While Gretna's policy was made in
the midst of emergency conditions, the policy was not a reasonable
limitation on evacuees' right to travel because it was not necessary to
preserve order, nor was it narrowly tailored to protect the safety of
Gretna residents. Gretna and its officers did not protect Katrina's victims; instead, Gretna and its officers further prolonged the evacuees'
misery. The officers' actions resulted in additional pain and suffering,
and even death. Because the city's and the officers' actions violated
evacuees' constitutional rights, and because the police officers acted
pursuant to a city policy, the city and the officers should be held civilly
liable under § 1983 for their actions. Furthermore, because the individual officers acted with the specific intent to impede evacuees from
crossing the bridge, the officers should be held criminally liable under
§ 242.
Certainly, the right to travel on interstate highways is fundamental;
but, the right to flee from a hazardous disaster area is not just implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty, it is essential to human dignity.
Hopefully, decades from now when teachers and historians reflect
back upon the Katrina disaster, we will be able to say that Katrina
taught us this lesson-and, that we listened.
4 39
New Orleans Talking Blues
When levees are flooded and hurricanes roar,
When the waters start seeping up under the door,

You'd expect the escape plans to include the poor
But this isn't that kind of song.
They shut the bus-stations, they shut down the train,
Two days in advance of the start of the rain.
The drivers drove out and the careless remain,
For all you're expecting is wrong.
439. Posting of papersky to http://papersky.livejournal.com/237021.html (Sept. 8,
2005, 13:43:00).
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You good folk responded with money and pity,
To help all survivors and each dog and kitty,
But nothing got through, for they'd cut off the city
And the time folks were waiting grew long.
The slow rising waters were foul and polluting
Survivors were starving and thirsting and looting,
They called them insurgents and said they were shooting,
But this isn't that kind of song.
Those poor folks, those black folks, they vote the wrong way,
They left them to rot, said they wanted to stay,
"This all worked out well for them," Barbara Bush say,
For all you're expecting is wrong.
You wanted to help and you really did care,
Those bastards in charge stand with weapons laid bare.
They laugh when they tell you that life isn't fair,
And the time we are waiting grows long.
Rebecca Eaton
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